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Privatizing  Russia 
WHEN  ANATOLY B. CHUBAIS was put in charge  of the State Committee 
on the Management  of State Property  (GKI)  in October  1991,  privatiza- 
tion was not at the top of Russia's reform  agenda. Price liberalization 
and  control  of the budget  were the top priorities.  Politicians  and  the pub- 
lic debated  whether  Russia  should  be privatizing  at all before  macroeco- 
nomic problems are solved. No privatization  program  existed at the 
time. In fact, the very name of Chubais'  agency reflected  the govern- 
ment's ambivalence  about  privatization. 
A year and  a half  later, privatization  has become the most successful 
reform  in Russia. By September  1993,  more  than  20 percent  of Russian 
industrial  workers  were employed  by privatized  firms.  Privatization  has 
spread  even more widely in service firms.  More than 60 percent of the 
Russian  people supported  privatization,  and  Chubais  has become one of 
the better  known  politicians. 
[Most  of the data  in this paper  exist in an unpublished  form  in Russian  agencies,  where 
they  were  collected  by the authors.  The  authors  took  care  to ensure  accurate  transcription 
of the data  in this  paper,  but  it has not been  possible  to verify  the data  as is usually  done  in 
the course  of editing  the paper.-Eds.] 
David  Fischer  and  Florencio  Lopez-de-Silanes  provided  excellent  research  assistance. 
Some  of the results  reported  in this paper  use surveys  conducted  by Joseph  Blasi  and  Ka- 
tharina  Pistor  for  the State  Committee  on the  Management  of State  Property.  We  are  grate- 
ful to Stanley  Fischer  and  Jeffrey  D. Sachs  for their  comments  at the Brookings  Panel. 
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In this paper,  we try to describe  and  evaluate  the progress  of Russian 
privatization.  Doing so at this point raises the obvious problem  of tim- 
ing. Privatization  in Russia is extremely young. What  has been accom- 
plished  is largely  a formal  transfer  of ownership  of cash flow and  control 
rights  of some firms  from the state to private  parties. Real changes in 
the operations  of enterprises  have barely  begun. We cannot, therefore, 
evaluate the progress  of Russian  privatization  based on the actual im- 
provements  in efficiency  it has delivered.  Instead,  we need  to use a more 
subjective  yardstick  to evaluate the accomplishments  of privatization, 
namely our educated estimate of the likelihood that privatization  will 
lead  to restructuring  of privatized  firms.  We argue  that  the key prerequi- 
site for restructuring  is depoliticization  of firms, meaning  a change in 
their conduct from meeting the wishes of politicians to maximizing 
profits.  In this paper,  we try to evaluate  whether  privatization  in Russia 
is in fact depoliticizing  state firms. 
The second section presents our case for looking at depoliticization 
to predict  restructuring  success. We  argue  that,  in most countries,  politi- 
cians try to influence  firms  to pursue  political  objectives, such as over- 
hiring  or locating  in particular  areas. Firms'  managers  extract  subsidies 
from  the treasury  in return  for addressing  these political  goals. The re- 
sult  of this politicization  of firms  is inefficiency  in public  enterprises.  We 
argue  that  privatization  is  just one of several steps that  make  it more  ex- 
pensive  for politicians  to influence  firms.  As such, privatization  reduces 
the amount  of inefficiency  that firms  accept to satisfy politicians,  but it 
does not make firms  fully efficient. Creating  product  market  competi- 
tion, improving  corporate  governance,  and  eliminating  political  control 
of capital  allocation  are other important  steps that make political  influ- 
ence more expensive. An important  message of the second section is 
that  debates about  whether  privatization,  corporatization,  or any other 
single measure  is sufficient  to make firms  efficient  miss the point:  these 
are all partial  measures  of depoliticization. 
In the third  section, we discuss the design  of the Russian  privatization 
program  in light  of the objective  of depoliticization.  In  particular,  we dis- 
cuss why Russia opted for voucher  privatization,  rather  than  for a Pol- 
ish-style mutual  fund scheme. We also show that, quite aside from its 
objectives, the Russian  program  was to a large  extent shaped  by the po- 
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The fourth  section presents the basic facts about Russian  privatiza- 
tion, including  some evidence on its extraordinary  speed. We also ad- 
dress an important  puzzle that the evidence raises, namely  the remark- 
ably low valuation  of Russian  firms  in the marketplace. 
In the fifth,  sixth, and  seventh sections, we look beyond  privatization 
and  ask what  other  mechanisms  can reduce  political  influence  on firms. 
The fifth section briefly describes the disnial state of product market 
competition  in Russia. The sixth section examines  governance  of firms 
through  equity  ownership.  We present  some survey  evidence suggesting 
that privatization  in Russia is leading  to very significant  ownership  by 
managers  and  workers,  and  some ownership  by large  outside  sharehold- 
ers. While  some management  and  outsider  ownership  is a cause for opti- 
mism, the extent of insider  entrenchment  raises concerns about future 
restructuring.  In the seventh section, we turn  to depoliticization  of capi- 
tal supply mechanisms  as a step toward depoliticization  of firms. We 
first  describe  the current  capital  allocation  mechanisms  in Russia, which 
are still primarily  political  and dominated  by the financing  practices of 
the government  and the central bank. Commercial  banks are playing 
only a minor  role in capital  allocation.  We also describe  the role of mac- 
roeconomic  stabilization  and  of foreign  aid in depoliticizing  capital  allo- 
cation  in Russia.  The evidence in the sixth  and  seventh  sections suggests 
that, in the near  future,  if capital  allocation  is to contribute  to depolitici- 
zation  of firms,  it should  avoid the highly  politicized  commercial  banks. 
The eighth section presents some evidence on the political  effects of 
Russian  privatization.  In particular,  we include results suggesting  that 
privatization  may have helped  President  Boris  Yeltsin  to win the crucial 
April  25 referendum,  in which  the Russian  people endorsed  him  and  the 
reforms.  We conclude  in the ninth  section by summarizing  our  findings. 
The Goals of Privatization 
To focus on the goals of privatization,  it is useful to start by asking 
what  is wrong  with public  enterprises  and  why. On  the question  of what 
is wrong, there is much agreement:  public enterprises  are inefficient. 
They employ too many people, produce  goods that consumers  do not 
want,  locate in economically  inefficient  places, do not upgrade  their  cap- 142  Brookings Paper-s on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
ital stock, and so on. While these problems  are particularly  severe in 
eastern  Europe, public  enterprises  throughout  the world  are conspicu- 
ous for their  inefficiency,  as well.  ' This observation  is no longer  contro- 
versial. 
The question  of why  public  enterprises  are inefficient  is harder  to an- 
swer. Standard  public finance starts with the assumption  that govern- 
ments maximize  social welfare, and views public enterprises  from this 
vantage  point. In particular,  public  enterprises  are supposedly  produc- 
tively efficient, and in fact cure monopoly and externality problems 
caused  by private  firms.2  As a positive theory  of public  enterprises,  this 
one fails miserably.  More recent work has stayed with the assumption 
of benevolent  government,  but argued  that  public  enterprises  are ineffi- 
cient because the government  is poorly  informed  about  their  efficiency, 
and so rationally  subsidizes them to pursue  uncertain  projects.3  These 
theories  might  explain  why governments  subsidize  highly  uncertain  re- 
search  and  development  projects  or defense contracts.  It does not, how- 
ever, make  much  sense as an explanation  of the dramatic  inefficiency  of 
public  agriculture,  coal mining,  and  other  relatively  routine  production. 
The high  costs and  inefficiencies  of such firms  are  public  knowledge,  yet 
the government  still does not insist on their  restructuring. 
An alternative  theory  of public  enterprise  argues  that they are ineffi- 
cient because they become the means by which politicians  attain  their 
political  objectives.4  Excess employment,  location  in economically  inef- 
ficient  places, and  underpricing  of output  all help  politicians  get votes or 
avoid riots. For example, it is plausible  to argue  that  the principal  objec- 
tive of the Russian  communists  was to secure their  own survival  against 
(perceived)  external  and internal  threats.  Many  features  of the commu- 
nist economy follow from this assumption. Russian state enterprises 
produced  so many  military  goods because  the politicians  cared  about  se- 
curity  and  not about  social welfare.  The government  lavished  capital  on 
military  firms  at the expense of consumer  product  firms  for the same  rea- 
son. The communist  government  invested resources in public health, 
but  not in health  care  for the elderly,  because it needed  healthy  soldiers, 
1. Mueller  (1989)  and  Vining  and  Boardman  (1992)  survey  the evidence  on the relative 
efficiency  of public  and  private  firms. 
2. Atkinson  and  Stiglitz  (1980). 
3. Laffont  and  Tirole  (1993)  and  Dewatripont  and  Maskin  (1990). 
4. A version  of this theory  is presented  in Boycko, Shleifer,  and  Vishny  (1993a). Maxim Boycko,  And)rei  Shleifer,  and Rober-t W. Vishny  143 
not because it was humanitarian.  The communist government  asked 
firms  to overemploy  people because it insisted on full employment  to 
prevent social unrest that would threaten  its control. The government 
created  large  collective farms  to control  peasants  and so avoid the per- 
ceived threat  from  them. State firms  produced  large  farm  machinery  to 
ensure that only these large state farms could survive. Thus, a simple 
view of political  objectives  can go some way toward  explaining  many  of 
the  inefficiencies of  the  Soviet  economy.  The  examples can  be 
multiplied  and  extended around  the world. Public  enterprises  are ineffi- 
cient because their  inefficiency  serves the goals of politicians. 
Except in a pure command  economy, managers  need not automati- 
cally do what  politicians  want them  to do. Instead,  managers  and  politi- 
cians bargain  over what  the firm  does. Managers'  objectives  usually  are 
closer to profit  maximization  than are those of politicians, if only be- 
cause  managers  want  to maximize  resources  under  their  control.  To con- 
vince  managers  to pursue  political  objectives,  politicians  subsidize  firms. 
In return  for those subsidies, managers  hire  extra  people, locate in eco- 
nomically  inefficient  places, and so on. Note that the relationship  be- 
tween politicians  and  managers  is best described  as a bargain:  managers 
might  be the ones who come to the politicians  and  beg  for money, threat- 
ening  to lay off workers  if they do not get funds. But such begging  works 
only when politicians  care about  employment.  Because politicians  want 
something  other than  profits  from firms,  bargaining  between managers 
and  politicians  results  in payments  from  governments  to firms  (subsidies 
or soft budget  constraints)  in return  for  the desired  inefficiency. 
This framework  has an obvious implication  for privatization  and 
other  restructuring  policies. Specifically,  the objective of these policies 
must be to change  the terms  of trade  in the bargain  between politicians 
and managers,  making  it more expensive for politicians  to buy ineffi- 
ciencies with subsidies.  To do that, the cost to the politician  of finding  a 
dollar  of subsidies  must increase, the ability  of that dollar  to buy extra 
inefficiency  must  fall, or both. When  subsidies  become more  expensive 
and  less effective, managers  will do less to cater  to the objectives  of the 
politicians,  and the firm  will begin to restructure.  In this paper,  we will 
consider  privatization  and other  policies from this perspective  of depo- 
liticization. 
The first question to ask is whether restructuring  actually requires 
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firms.  It is sometimes  argued  that  all that  is really  necessary  is to change 
control from politicians to managers:  in other words, to corporatize 
state firms.' Once control changes, cash flows can remain publicly 
owned as long as managers  have some incentives to maximize  profits. 
These incentives  might  come from  incentive  contracts  for the managers, 
from  product  market  competition,  or from hard  credit  policies; we dis- 
cuss these issues later. Indeed, in Poland, many state enterprises  have 
begun to restructure  in the regime of product  market  competition  and 
stricter  oversight by banks without privatization.6  This evidence sug- 
gests that privatization  of cash flows is not necessary for restructuring 
when control  is removed  from  politicians. 
The depoliticization  model outlined  above suggests  that corporatiza- 
tion is one of the key steps that  make  subsidies  less effective. By shifting 
control  from  politicians  to managers,  corporatization  enables  managers 
to extract  more surplus  in the bargain  with politicians.  Whereas  before 
corporatization,  politicians  could order firms,  for example, to employ 
extra  people, after  corporatization,  they must  pay them  to do so, which 
is more  expensive. Because corporatization  raises  the cost to politicians 
of getting  firms  to cater to their  wishes, it stimulates  restructuring.  But 
how much restructuring  it stimulates  depends on other factors deter- 
mining  the costs of political  influence.  For example, in Poland  after  sta- 
bilization,  the combination  of corporatization  and tight  budgets signifi- 
cantly reduced subsidies to  firms and stimulated restructuring.  In 
Russia, monetary  policy is not as tight, and hence the effectiveness of 
corporatization  by itself  would  likely  be much  lower, because  politicians 
have too much money to influence  firms.  More generally,  corporatiza- 
tion has often failed to lead to significant  restructuring  because politi- 
cians  have attempted  to regain  their  control  over firms.7  In a country  like 
Russia, where the mechanisms  of political  influence  are numerous  and 
the politicians'  demand  for influence  is high, corporatization  by itself is 
a rather  weak measure. 
5. For a discussion  of distinction  between cash flow rights  and control  rights  in the 
characterization  of ownership,  see Grossman  and  Hart  (1986). 
6.  See Pinto,  Belka,  and  Krajewski  (1993)  and  Blanchard  and  Dambrowski  (1993). 
7. Nellis (1988)  presents  evidence  that  incentive  contracts  of managers  of public  enter- 
prises  are often repealed  when managers  begin  to restructure  in earnest  and thus violate 
the goals  of the politicians.  After  their  contracts  are  repealed,  managers  are  told  explicitly 
not to lay off workers,  to continue  building  plants  where  politicians  want  them,  and  so on. 
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Of course, everywhere  in the world  politicians  try to exert influence 
over private  firms-let  alone state enterprises-by  offering  them pro- 
curement  contracts,  regulatory  and  tax breaks,  and  outright  subsidies  in 
return  for meeting  political objectives. So what does privatization  ac- 
complish  that  corporatization  does not?  How does privatization  depolit- 
icize firms?  First, when managers  and outsider shareholders  receive 
substantial  cash flow rights,  the cost of convincing  firms  to be inefficient 
by pursuing  political  objectives rises because they now care about the 
forgone  profits  from failing  to restructure.  This incentive effect makes 
it more expensive for politicians  to get what they want, and hence can 
accelerate restructuring.  Second, in many cases, the mechanisms  for 
political  influence  over firms  are dismantled  when firms  are privatized. 
For example, after  privatization,  ministries  are abolished.  This change 
both eliminates  one political  constituency  that  wants to control  the firm 
(the ministry)  and makes  control  by politicians  operationally  more  diffi- 
cult. Third,  privatization  creates a political  constituency  of owner-tax- 
payers  who oppose government  interference  in the economy because it 
raises  their  taxes and  reduces  their  profits;  this contributes  to depolitici- 
zation  through  a political  mechanism,  rather  than  an economic  one. For 
all  these reasons, privatization  by itself is a critical  strategy  of depolitici- 
zation, and  hence restructuring. 
Beyond Privatization 
Important  as privatization  may be for depoliticization,  it is not suffi- 
cient. Politicians  try and  often succeed in getting  private  firms  to pursue 
political objectives, as well. For example, in Russia, privatized  firms 
still receive subsidies  in exchange  for keeping  up employment.  In Italy, 
many  private  firms  continue close relationships  with politicians. Other 
measures promoting  depoliticization  must complement privatization. 
This  paper  will examine  three  critical  strategies:  competition  policy, eq- 
uity  governance,  and capital  allocation. 
Throughout  the world, product  market  competition  plays a critical 
role in depoliticizing  firms. When firms  face efficient rivals, they must 
be efficient  themselves to survive in the marketplace,  or else be subsi- 
dized.8  But keeping  an inefficient  firm  in a competitive  market  from  go- 
8. Hart  (1983)  presents  a formal  model. 146  Br-ookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
ing  bankrupt  is much  more  expensive for a politician  than  keeping  afloat 
an inefficient  monopoly that can waste large monopoly rents before it 
begins to lose money. Unfortunately,  politicians  realize that competi- 
tion raises  the cost to them  of exerting  influence,  and  often restrict  prod- 
uct market  competition  by political  action. First, politicians  often pro- 
tect domestic  firms  from  both foreign  and domestic competition,  which 
of course  leaves them  with rents  that  can be dissipated  on politically  de- 
sirable  activities. Second, bankruptcy  procedures  are often politicized, 
and hence inefficient  firms  are "rehabilitated"  rather  than  allowed  to go 
bankrupt.  But when politicians  fail to undermine  competition,  restruc- 
turing  benefits  come quickly. Notably, Poland  and the Czech Republic 
have made  great  strides  in depoliticizing  firms  by creating  a competitive 
marketplace,  both by encouraging  domestic  competition  and  opening  to 
international  trade. 
The second important  depoliticization  mechanism  is equity gover- 
nance:  giving  equity  ownership  to active decisionmakers.  Equity  gover- 
nance of necessity entails significant  management  ownership.  It is also 
fostered by significant  shareholdings  by large investors-also  referred 
to as core investors  or active investors-who  can put pressure  on man- 
agers to restructure  and to resist pressures  from politicians.9  The reli- 
ance on core investors for governance  has characterized  privatization 
programs  in France, Mexico, and, more recently, the Czech Republic. 
Unfortunately,  politicians  can also disrupt  the functioning  of this gover- 
nance mechanism  as well by preventing  outside shareholders  from vot- 
ing their shares  or otherwise  exercising  their  control  rights. 
The  third  key depoliticization  mechanism  is replacing  political  alloca- 
tion of capital  with private  allocation.  As long as the allocation  of credit 
in the economy is politicized, the firms  that cater to politicians,  rather 
than to shareholders,  will get credit. Bankrupt  firms will simply seek 
debt relief  from  the politicians  and satisfy political  objectives in return. 
Even managers  with incentives either through  their own ownership  or 
through  pressure  from  large shareholders  will cater to politicians  in ex- 
change  for credits  and  subsidies.  The success of restructuring  relies  crit- 
ically on depoliticizing  credit  policies. 
9. Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1986)  stress  the role  of large  shareholders  in  governing  firms  in 
the West. Frydman  and  Rapaczynski  (1991),  Lipton  and  Sachs  (1990),  and  Blanchard  and 
his colleagues  (1991)  present  privatization  schemes that turn  on the pivotal  role of large 
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This necessitates  two things. First, it requires  eliminating  soft credits 
and government subsidies, which have historically been politicians' 
most effective mechanism  of control. But politicians cannot be con- 
trolled  unless money is controlled.  Hardening  the budget  constraints  of 
firms  requires  macroeconomic  stabilization.  Second, depoliticization  of 
capital requires  that capital be available on commercial  terms. While 
some restructuring  can occur without  much new investment  (firms  can 
lay off some employees, change their product mix using the existing 
equipment,  reduce  waste in inventories,  and so on), substantial  restruc- 
turing  usually  requires  capital.  Needless to say, such depoliticization  of 
capital  allocation  is usually opposed by politicians, who try to control 
credit  policies through  bankruptcy  regulation,  control  of banks, and in- 
flationary  finance.  But while getting  private  capital  allocation  to replace 
political  capital  allocation  may  be the hardest  task, it is perhaps  the most 
significant  for eventual  depoliticization  of firms. 
To summarize,  restructuring  the Russian  economy requires  depoliti- 
cization of firms. This strategy must be pursued on many fronts, in- 
cluding privatization,  competition policy, corporate governance, and 
capital  allocation.  To assess the likely success of the Russian  privatiza- 
tion, we will need to look at the progress  on all these fronts. 
Political  Goals of Privatization 
Even though  the ultimate  economic objective of privatization  is re- 
structuring,  privatization  is always and  everywhere  a political phenom- 
enon. The goal of governments  that launch privatization  always is to 
gain support  for the reformist  (or conservative)  politicians.  Mass priva- 
tization  fits this mandate  particularly  well because it is perceived  by the 
general  populace  as the only part  of the economic  reform  that  can unam- 
biguously benefit them. Unlike price liberalization, monetary tight- 
ening, and reduction  of government  spending,  all of which  impose pain- 
ful costs on some people, privatization  allocates shares  to the people  for 
free or at low prices-typically a popular  measure.  The political  support 
for  privatization  might  even spill  over to other  reforms,  such  as stabiliza- 
tion. By creating  a class of supporters  of reform  and  reducing  the power 
of its opponents, privatization  can change the political balance in the 
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The  need  to gain  support  for reform  is the political  argument  for priva- 
tizing  rapidly.  If privatization  is slow, the benefits  to the population  are 
by definition  small, and hence the political  capital  they buy the reform- 
ers is small as well. Fast privatization  is privatization  that offers large 
political  benefits  from the start-exactly  what a reformist  government 
needs. Critics  of fast privatization  have argued  that  it creates  fast unem- 
ployment  and thus drains  the government  budget.'0  This can produce 
both political  opposition  and economic problems  for further  privatiza- 
tion. This argument  overlooks two essential points. First, privatization 
in eastern Europe  is inherently  very slow. Slowing it down further  be- 
yond what internal  political forces accomplish will stop it altogether. 
Second, and more important,  rapid  privatization  buys enormous  politi- 
cal benefits  and  thus allows reforms  to deepen. 
The Russian Privatization  Program 
The Russian  privatization  program  was designed to meet the objec- 
tives discussed  above.  " Yet it was also designed  in an extremely  hostile 
political  environment.  As a result,  the program  had  to accommodate  the 
political  and economic demands  of various stakeholders  in state firms, 
so as to get their  support  or at least preclude  active opposition.  The prin- 
cipal stakeholders included enterprise managers and employees- 
whose lobbies  controlled  the parliament  and  who themselves  effectively 
controlled state firms in the transition-and local governments, who 
gained  much  of the political  influence  over firms  that  the center  lost. The 
second part of this section explains how these constraints  shaped the 
privatization  program. 
Description  of the Program 
As a first  step, the program  divided  firms  into  those that  would  be sold 
primarily  for cash by the local governments  and  those that  would  go into 
the mass privatization  program.  In this way, most small  shops and some 
10. See, for example,  Aghion  and  Blanchard  (1993). 
11. Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1992)  and  Boycko  and  Shleifer  (1993)  present  some  ideas  that 
went into the program.  A legal description  is found  in Frydman,  Rapaczynski,  and  Earle 
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smaller enterprises were immediately  allocated to the local govern- 
ments, who demanded  the revenues from small-scale  privatization  as 
their  major  concession (although  later, small  shops were sold for vouch- 
ers as well). 
As a second step, the program  delineated  larger  firms  into those sub- 
ject to mandatory  privatization,  those subject  to privatization  with the 
permission  of the privatization  ministry,  those requiring  government  ap- 
proval  for privatization,  and those whose privatization  was prohibited. 
Mandatory  privatization  included  firms  in light  industries,  including  tex- 
tiles, food processing, and furniture. Firms requiring  GKI approval 
tended to be somewhat  larger  firms,  yet not operating  in any of the im- 
portant strategic industries. Major  firms in most strategic industries, 
such as natural  resources  and  defense, could  only be privatized  with the 
agreement  of the entire government.  Given the antireformist  composi- 
tion of the government  in 1993,  this restriction  meant  that  these firms  in 
general  could not be privatized.  Even if some part  of their  equity could 
be privately  owned, control always remained  with politicians. Finally, 
some firms, including  those involved in space exploration,  health, and 
education,  could not be privatized  at all. 
As a third  step, all large  and medium-sized  firms  (except those in the 
last  list) were  to be corporatized.  12 That  is to say, they were  to re-register 
as joint stock companies with all equity owned by the government, 
adopt  a corporate  charter,  and  appoint  a board  of directors.  Initially,  the 
board  would include representatives  from the property  fund (the gov- 
ernment's  selling  agency), the management,  the workers,  suppliers,  and 
customers. The corporatization  decree, signed by President  Yeltsin in 
June 1992, was correctly viewed as the first major  step toward subse- 
quent  privatization  of state firms. 
In tandem  with corporatization,  divisions of state firms  had the right 
to split off from the holding company and become independent.  This 
proved  to be rather  difficult  because of resistance  from  the management 
of the holding  company  and  the local officials,  who preferred  to deal  with 
larger  firms.  Nonetheless, such splitoffs  occurred  in many  cases. 
Once a firm corporatized, its managers and workers got to pick 
among three privatization  options. The first option (variant 1) gave 
workers  25 percent of the shares of the enterprise  for free, yet made 
12. Sachs  (1992)  makes  the arguments  for corporatization. 150  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
these shares  nonvoting.  Top managers  could purchase  5 percent of the 
shares  at a nominal  price. In addition,  after privatization,  the workers 
and  the managers  could get an additional  10  percent  at a 30 percent  dis- 
count to book value through something that resembles an employee 
stock ownership  plan (ESOP).  The second option (variant  2) gave man- 
agers  and  workers  together  51  percent  of the equity,  all voting,  at a nomi- 
nal  price  of 1.7 times the July 1992  book value of assets. This, of course, 
represented  a very low price  relative  to the market  value of these assets 
in a highly  inflationary  environment.  Workers  could  pay  for these shares 
in cash, with vouchers (to be discussed later), or through  the retained 
earnings  of the enterprise,  and could pay over some relatively  short  pe- 
riod  of time. As in the first  option,  an additional  5 percent  of shares  could 
be obtained  by managers  and workers  at low prices through  the ESOP. 
Finally, a third  option (variant  3), imposed by the managerial  lobby in 
the parliament,  allowed the managers  to buy up to 40 percent of the 
shares  at very low prices  if they promised  not to go bankrupt.  For a vari- 
ety of reasons, this option  has hardly  been used.  13 
Once the managers  and workers  selected their benefits  option, they 
could submit a privatization  plan that described how the rest of the 
shares  were to be sold. While  some enterprises  are subject  to mandatory 
privatization,  in practice, the filing of privatization  plans is almost al- 
ways voluntary. The principal  way in which the sale of shares takes 
place in Russia  is through  auctions  of shares  for vouchers.  Every person 
in Russia was offered  a privatization  voucher  for a small  fee, and most 
people picked them up. The voucher had a denomination  of 10,000  ru- 
bles, was supposed to expire at the end of 1993,  and was freely trada- 
ble.14 This voucher could then be used as the sole allowable  means of 
payment in auctions of shares of privatizing  enterprises. Each priva- 
tizing enterprise  enters into its individual  voucher auction in the city 
where it is headquartered;  systems have been built to enable  people to 
buy shares of firms  located in other cities. Bidding  in these auctions is 
very easy: the principal  type of bid is to submit  the voucher and to get 
however  many  shares  it buys at the equilibrium  price. Because vouchers 
are  tradable,  some investors  acquire  blocks  of vouchers  and  bid  for large 
blocks of shares.  In a typical  company,  up  to 30  percent  of the shares  are 
13.  See Frydman, Rapaczynski,  and Earle (1993, pp. 55-57). 
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sold in voucher  auctions, although  smaller  stakes are sold in "strategic" 
enterprises  that  are privatized. 
Voucher  privatization  is clearly the defining  feature of the Russian 
program.  It was chosen over the alternative  mass privatization  scheme 
using  mutual  funds  for four reasons, listed in order  of increasing  impor- 
tance.  15 First, a mutual  fund  scheme would  be too difficult  to implement 
in Russia technologically. Second, it was hoped that vouchers would 
more  actively involve people in privatization  by giving  them  a choice of 
what  to invest in, and  hence make  privatization  more  popular  to the pub- 
lic than  a mutual  fund scheme, which does not involve choice. Third,  a 
mutual fund scheme that imposed large shareholders on managers 
would have created serious opposition from the managerial  lobby, 
which would have made made implementation  of the program  difficult. 
Fourth,  there was a great concern in Russia that large state-sponsored 
mutual  funds owning  large stakes in Russian  companies  would become 
politicized and hence be unable to enforce restructuring  policies. For 
these four reasons, Russia  gave up the instant  large  shareholder  advan- 
tage of Polish-style  mutual  funds and opted for a voucher  privatization 
program.  16 
The fate of the shares neither allocated to the workers nor sold in 
voucher  auctions  remains  uncertain.  About 5 percent  of the number  of 
shares  sold in a voucher  auction  can be later  sold by property  funds (the 
local government  offices selling  the shares)  for cash, with the proceeds 
to be used to offset the expenses of privatization,  as well as pay bonuses 
to bureaucrats.  This approach  has proved popular  with property  funds 
that  want  to sell more  for  cash they can retain.  Another  strategy  incorpo- 
rated  into the privatization  program  is to sell shares  through  investment 
tenders  to domestic or foreign  investors, where the means of payment 
would be investment commitments,  rather  than vouchers or cash. In 
practice, this strategy has often amounted  to a giveaway of shares to 
managers,  their  relatives, and  friends.  In other  cases, some shares  can, 
in principle,  be retained  by the government  for some period  of time. In 
yet other  cases, the government  might  contribute  the shares  toward  in- 
15. The case for the mutual  fund  scheme  is presented  by Lipton  and  Sachs (1990).  In 
the context of Russia, Sachs (1992)  suggests  that the choice of a mass privatization  pro- 
gram  is not important  as long  as that  program  is actually  implemented. 
16. A more detailed  discussion  of voucher schemes versus mutual  fund schemes is 
contained  in Frydman  and  Rapaczynski  (1991)  and  Boycko, Shleifer,  and  Vishny  (1993b). 152  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1993 
dustry  associations  and financial-industrial  groups;  we will discuss this 
later.  In most enterprises,  the privatization  of the last 20 or so percent  of 
the shares was not fully specified  by the privatization  plan, and hence 
shares  remain  in the government-controlled  property  funds. 
The Program  in Light of the Constraints It Faced 
The design of the program  clearly reflected  the political  constraints. 
As we show below, most important  stakeholders  received  major  conces- 
sions. Local governments  gained  control  over small-scale  privatization, 
as well as most revenues from it. They would have received revenues 
from  large-scale  privatization  as well, except that  the means  of payment 
were vouchers. Most important,  voucher auctions were run locally, 
which gave local governments  some limited  opportunity  to exclude un- 
desirable  outsiders.  Thanks  to these concessions, local governments  in 
most cases did not resist privatization,  although  many  would have pre- 
ferred  cash to voucher  payments. 
Workers  in enterprises  being privatized  received the most generous 
concessions of any privatization  in the world. They have gotten either 
25 percent of the firm  for free (plus an ESOP), or 51 percent (plus an 
ESOP)  at a discount.  Moreover,  they get to choose the privatization  op- 
tion that  the firm  chooses in a vote. With  the benefit  of hindsight,  work- 
ers' benefits  in the Russian  privatization  appear  very high,  and  may  have 
adverse consequences for governance, as discussed below. It is im- 
portant  to realize, however, that  at the time the program  was proposed, 
the groups in the parliament  demanding  total worker ownership ap- 
peared  to present  the greatest  threat  to privatization.  Only  by making  a 
coalition with those groups by offering significant  worker ownership 
could  the reformers  succeed in defeating  the managerial  lobbies that  op- 
posed privatization. 
Concessions to the managers  do not appear  large  on the surface, but 
in truth  they are enormous.  Although  managers'  direct  ownership  stake 
is only 5 percent in variant 1-perhaps  higher in variant  2-in  many 
cases, managers  buy additional  shares  cheaply  in voucher  auctions  or in 
the aftermarket  from  employees. A much  more  important  concession to 
the managers  is that the privatization  program  does not impose large 
shareholders  on the firm,  so managerial  independence  in Russia  is much 
greater  than elsewhere in eastern Europe. Recall that in the Czech Re- Maxim Boycko,  Andrei Shleifer,  and Robert  W. Vishny  153 
Table 1.  Corporatization Results by July 1, 1993 
Corporatization  procedure 
Corporatization  measure  Mandatory  Voluntary  Subdivisions  Total 
Permission  issued  2,918  6,508  1,237  10,663 
Registered  firms  1,838  4,121  518  6,477 
Percent  choosing variant  ia  30.6  18.1  11.7  21.0 
Percent  choosing  variant  2b  68.3  80.5  87.3  77.8 
Percent  choosing variant  3c  1.1  1.4  1.0  1.3 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based  on  data  from  the  State  Committee  on  the  Management  of  State  Property 
(GKI). 
a.  Gives  workers  25  percent  of  nonvoting  shares  for  free.  Managers  can  purchase  5  percent  of  the  shares  at 
nominal prices.  After privatization,  workers and managers can acquire an additional  10 percent through an ESOP. 
b.  Gives  managers and workers 51 percent of equity,  all voting,  at a nominal price of  1.7 times the July 1992 book 
value of assets.  An additional 5 percent could be purchased through an ESOP. 
c.  Allows  managers to buy up to 40 percent of the shares at low prices if they promise not to go bankrupt. 
public firms  got core investors as part of privatization,  and in Poland 
they are expected to get mutual  funds as blockholders.  Because major 
shareholders  were not forcibly imposed on the privatization  process, 
managers  tacitly gained  a major  concession, reflecting  their  parliamen- 
tary  influence,  as well as their  de facto control  of enterprises.  Insistence 
on core investors  would  have aroused  strong  opposition  from  managers 
and made privatization  impossible, especially because privatization  in 
Russia  is still effectively discretionary. 
While granting  concessions to many important  groups, the Russian 
privatization  failed to address the wishes of the central bureaucracy. 
The result has been that the bureaucracy  has continued  to fight  priva- 
tization every step of the way. Bribing  the bureaucracy  is one of the 
greatest  challenges  of any economic reform. 
In short, the Russian privatization  program  represents a political 
compromise  reflecting  the existing property  rights and political influ- 
ences in the country. The real question  is whether, nonetheless, priva- 
tization  is likely to lead to restructuring.  We turn  to this question  next. 
The Progress of Russian Privatization 
Table 1 presents the results on corporatization.  By July 1, 1993,  out 
of 4,972 large enterprises  slated for mandatory  privatization,  GKI and 
local privatization  committees issued decisions to privatize for 2,918 
enterprises,  or 59 percent, of which 1,838, or 63 percent were actually 154  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1993 
registered as joint stock companies. In addition, 6,508 enterprises 
corporatized on  a  voluntary basis.  The  apparent enthusiasm for 
corporatization  among many small and medium-sized  enterprises  sug- 
gests that workers  and managers  concluded  that corporatization  would 
give them  more  benefits  and/or  better  opportunities  to keep control  over 
the enterprise  than small-scale  privatization.  17 Finally, some 1,237  joint 
stock companies  were formed  on the basis of subdivisions  of state  enter- 
prises that separated  from their holding  conmpany.  Overall,  by July 1, 
1993,  6,477  joint stock companies  were registered. 
As table 1 shows, in 77.8 percent of the enterprises, workers have 
chosen variant  2, which gives them and the managers  voting  control;  in 
21 percent  of enterprises,  they have chosen variant  1. In most cases, the 
ostensible reason  for choosing variant  2 is that otherwise  control  might 
revert  to outsiders. Workers  have chosen variant  1 when the enterprise 
has been too capital-intensive  for workers and their families to afford 
variant  2, or when the relationship  between workers  and managers  has 
been sufficiently  tense that the managers  fear giving workers voting 
shares. Interestingly, variant 3 has hardly ever been chosen,  even 
though  it would  give the largest  ownership  stake to the managers. 
Voucher Distribution  and  Use 
Between October  1992  and  January  1993, 150  million  Russians  could 
pick up their vouchers at their local savings banks. The fee for the 
voucher  was only 25 rubles  (5 cents at the prevailing  exchange  rate).  Be- 
cause, as we explained,  privatization  in Russia  was much  more  populist 
than  in the Czech Republic,  the idea of charging  a reasonable  participa- 
tion fee ($35 in the Czech Republic)  to eliminate  marginally  interested 
citizens was rejected. By the end of January  1993,  almost  97 percent  of 
vouchers  had  been distributed. 
Shortly  after  its introduction,  the voucher  became the first  liquid  se- 
curity  in Russia. It is actively traded  on dozens of organized  exchanges 
throughout  the country. On the largest  exchange in Moscow, the Rus- 
sian  Commodity  and  Raw  Material  Exchange,  the volume  of trade  easily 
17. In small-scale  privatization  in Russia, the main  benefit  provided  to workers  is a 
cash payment  equaling  30 percent  of the price  obtained  in the auction.  If the workers'  col- 
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Figure 1.  Voucher Prices in Rubles and Dollars, October 22,  1992-July 23,  1993 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on GKI data. 
reaches 60,000 to 100,000  vouchers per day ($600,000  to $1 million at 
prevailing prices).  Apparently, investors willing to  participate in 
voucher  auctions  do not face major  problems  in assembling  large  blocks 
of vouchers. 
Wide  swings in the market  price  of the voucher,  as shown in figure  1, 
seem to be easily attributable  to political  developments  in Russia.  18 The 
voucher  rose briefly  in the second half  of November  and  early  December 
1992,  anticipating  demand  for vouchers  from  investors  in the upcoming 
closed subscriptions  and  voucher  auctions.  The  fall of acting  Prime  Min- 
ister Yegor T. Gaidar  in mid-December  led to a collapse in the voucher 
market. From January  through  April 1993, more than 1,300 voucher 
auctions notwithstanding,  the ruble voucher price stagnated, quickly 
falling  in dollar  terms.  The voucher  price  doubled  shortly  after  President 
Yeltsin's victory  in the April  25 referendum,  which  revealed  strong  pub- 
lic support  for the economic  reform.  19 
18. The  more  puzzling  fact that  the voucher  price  is so low is discussed  below. 
19. After President  Yeltsin disbanded  the Russian  parliament  and declared  the new 
election, the voucher  price  more  than  doubled  by early November  1993  to 27,000  rubles 
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Table 2.  Voucher Auctions, December 1992-June  1993 
Voutc  her auction  Per-iod 
statistic  December  January  February  Marc/h  Apr  il  May  Jutne  total 
Number of enterprises 
sold  18  105  188  416  582  477  632  2,418 
Number of regions 
participating  8  19  29  51  58  48  61  75 
Number of employees 
(thousands)  47  191  181  651  898  511  692  3,171 
Charter  capital sold 
(millions of rubles)  513  607  1,375  5,318  7,057  4,193  6,102  25,165 
Weighted average 
percent of charter 
capital sold  17  11  23  20  24  21  23  21 
Vouchers accepted 
(thousands)  158  150  501  2,188  4,854  2,666  3,526  14,043 
Weighted average 
auction rate (shares 
per voucher)  3.2  4.0  2.7  2.4  1.5  1.6  1.7  1.8 
Source: Authors'  calculations  based  on GKI  data. 
The Pace  of  Voucher Auctions 
Table  2 presents  some basic statistics  on the pace of voucher  auctions 
in Russia.20  Voucher  auctions  began in December 1992,  when eighteen 
firms  were sold in eight  regions. By April,  the pace of sales had  acceler- 
ated to include  582 enterprises  in fifty-eight  regions. In May, the rate of 
sales fell because auction preparations  had stopped in April as people 
waited  out the April  25 referendum.  In  June, sales recovered  to 632  firms 
in sixty-one  regions,  which  seems to be a sustainable  monthly  rate. Alto- 
gether, 2,418 firms  had been privatized  in voucher auctions  by the end 
of June. 
One way to look at the pace of sales is by focusing on the number  of 
employees  who work  in privatized  companies.  By the end of June, more 
than 3.6 million  employees worked in firms  privatized  in voucher auc- 
tions, which represents  roughly 18 percent of the manufacturing  labor 
force in Russia. In March  through  June, the privatization  rate averaged 
700,000  employees  per  month,  or about  3.5 percent  of industrial  employ- 
20. Voucher  auctions  are the best documented  part  of the large-scale  privatization  in 
Russia.  Little  aggregate  information  exists about  the actual  pace of closed subscriptions, 
in which workers  and managers  buy shares  according  to the chosen variant.  In the vast 
majority  of cases, a closed subscription  precedes  a voucher  auction  for a given  company. 
Thus,  before  a voucher  auction,  some  40 to 51  percent  of shares  of a typical  company  have 
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ment. If this rate  continues  to the end of 1993,  another  4 million  Russian 
industrial  workers  will end up in the private  sector, so that  the total will 
amount  to about  40 percent  of manufacturing  employment.  This  is rather 
fast for one year of privatization  in a country  where no other  reform  has 
worked.21 
An average  firm  whose shares  are auctioned  has about 1,300  employ- 
ees and 50 million  rubles  of charter  capital. It sells about 22 percent of 
its shares  (11  million  rubles  of charter  capital)  in the auction,  in exchange 
for about 5,300 vouchers. In terms of numbers, medium-sized  firms 
dominate:  71 percent  of firms  privatized  through  voucher  auctions  have 
fewer than 1,000 employees. However, large firms  account for a very 
large  share  of privatized  assets and employment.  Firms  with more  than 
1,000  employees account for 83 percent  of employment  and 86 percent 
of assets of enterprises  privatized  through  voucher  auctions. As table 3 
suggests, large  firms  on average  privatize  somewhat  faster  than  medium 
and small  firms. 
Asset  Values 
One of the most interesting  aspects of voucher  auctions  is the prices 
at which assets sell. Table  2 shows that  the number  of shares  (each with 
a book value of 1,000  rubles)  received  per voucher  started  out at around 
3 or 4 at the turn  of the year, and  fell toward  1.5 in April  and  May  before 
recovering  to 1.7 in June. To interpret  these numbers,  we can convert 
them into a dollar  price per share. Because vouchers  are traded  in Rus- 
sia, we can convert  share  prices  from  vouchers  to rubles.  Figure  1 shows 
a time series of voucher  prices in both currencies.  Because the ruble  has 
been freely convertible  in 1993, we can then convert ruble prices into 
dollars. Using this information,  we have calculated  that, in April and 
May, the average  dollar  value of 1,000  rubles  of charter  capital  acquired 
in a voucher  auction  was around  $3 and  rose to $5 in June. 
A rough  computation  suggests what these numbers  imply. Suppose 
that enterprises  that were privatized  by July 1993  are representative  of 
the Russian  industry  (this is not a perfect assumption  because none of 
the most valuable natural  resource industries have been privatized). 
21. Through  October  1993,  5,925  enterprises  had  been  privatized,  with  a total  employ- 
ment  of 6.35 million  workers,  or about  32 percent  of the industrial  labor  force. Thus the 
goal  of 40 percent  by the end of 1993  appears  solidly  within  reach. as  ?C  "C  r- 
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These enterprises  constitute about 15 percent of the Russian industry, 
and  approximately  20 percent  of the value of these enterprises  has been 
sold in voucher  auctions. That is, a total of 3 percent of all equity was 
sold through  June 1993.  As table 2 indicates, about 15  million  vouchers 
were accepted  for this equity, with a price per voucher  consistently  be- 
low $10. Because most transactions  took place in later  months, an opti- 
mistic  estimate  of the dollar  value of accepted vouchers  is $150  million. 
That  puts the total value of the Russian industry  at about $5 billion. It 
is possible to make these calculations  differently  and to come up with 
numbers  as high  as $10 billion. The point, however, is inescapable:  the 
entire  Russian  industrial  complex  is valued  in voucher  auctions  at some- 
thing  like the value of a large  Fortune  500 company. 
Perhaps  an even more dramatic  way to look at the numbers  is to ex- 
amine  the prices in some focal transactions.  Table  4 presents  the results 
of voucher  auctions  and lists the implied  dollar  values of the ten largest 
companies  by employment  and  the ten most valuable  transactions.  The 
market  value of ZIL, the truck and limousine maker with more than 
100,000  employees, with a ready  market  for as much  of its product  as it 
can make, and with a large chunk of Moscow real estate, is about $16 
million. The market values of Uralmash and Permsky Motors, two 
household  names in Russian  manufacturing,  are $4 million  and $6 mil- 
lion, respectively.  The Caterpillar  and  General  Electric  of Russian  man- 
ufacturing  thus appear  to be virtually  worthless. 
The list of most valuable  companies  contains  some new names. Next 
to ZIL, the most valuable company is Hotel MINSK in the center of 
Moscow (with 154 employees), whose management  made a futile at- 
tempt  to keep the price  of shares  low by disguising  the name  of the com- 
pany  (presumably  they wanted  to buy more  shares  themselves). A Mos- 
cow chocolate factory with 1,500  employees is worth 50 percent more 
than Uralmash,  with 34,000. Some businesses do have value, although 
the overall  level of prices is quite  low. 
One  way to calibrate  how low the prices  of manufacturing  companies 
are is to note that U.S. manufacturing  companies  have market  value of 
about $100,000 per employee. Russian manufacturing  companies, in 
contrast,  have market  value of about $100  per employee-a  1,000-fold 
difference! 
What  might  explain  such a low price  level of Russian  assets? The first 
hypothesis  is that  most of these firms  really  are  worthless, because they 160  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
Table 4.  Ten Largest Enterprises Sold in Voucher Auctions by Employment 
and by Value as of July 1, 1993 
Implied 
dollar 
Month  of  value  of 
Employees  Name of enterprise  Induistiy  sale  enterprise 
Ten  largest enterprises  by emnployment 
103,000  ZIL  Truck manufacturing  April  15,857,826 
44,817  Preobrazhenskaya  Fishing  April  118,477 
42,928  Rostselmash  Automobile  manufacturing  April  771,477 
35,000  Permsky Motors  Engine manufacturing  March  6,276,015 
34,041  Uralmash  Machine production  April  3,908,214 
32,769  Zapadno-Sibirsky Metallurgical  Metal production  March  3,890,820 
27,351  Ribinsky Motors  Aircraft engines  March  988,241 
26,417  Volgograd Tractor Factory  Tractor manufacturing  March  570,747 
24,198  Pervouralsky Novotrubny  Metal production  April  2,548,514 
17,942  Dalnevostochnoi  Morskoi  Shipping  April 
Parochodstvo 
Ten  largest enterprises  by implied  dollar value 
103,000  ZIL  Truck manufacturing  April  15,857,826 
154  Na Tverskoi  Hotels  May  8,412,378 
8,056  Sayan Aluminum Plant  Aluminum production  December  6,716,613 
35,000  Permsky Motors  Engine manufacturing  March  6,276,015 
1,490  Russian Chocolate  Factory  Chocolate  production  January  5,724,558 
34,041  Uralmash  Machine production  April  3,908,214 
32,769  Zapadno-Sibirsky Metallurgical  Metal production  March  3,890,820 
16,500  Vladimir Tractor Factory  Tractor manufacturing  March  3,692,419 
10,373  Bratsky Aluminum Factory  Aluminum production  May  3,597,752 
4,940  Koksokhim  Chemical production  May  3,343,053 
Source: Authors'  calculations  based  on GKI  data. 
have a very outdated  capital stock. We submit,  however, that this hy- 
pothesis  goes only part  of the way in explaining  the pricing.  Consider  the 
following rough calculation. At the purchasing-power-parity  value of 
the dollar of about 300 rubles, Russian manufacturing  wages average 
about  $200  per  month,  which is about  one-tenth  of Western  manufactur- 
ing wages. In fact, estimates of the Russian  standard  of living as about 
one-tenth  the Western  standard  are suggested  by more  detailed  calcula- 
tions. If the value  of the Russian  companies  were in the same  proportion 
to wages  as it is in the West, then  these companies  should  be worth  about 
one-tenth  of what  their  Western  counterparts  are  worth. On  this calcula- 
tion, the value ratio  of 1,000  still seems implausible. 
The low quality  of Russian  assets thus fails to explain  their  low mar- 
ket value by a factor of 100. Additional  explanations  are needed. One 
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low value of assets is explained by this low value of private wealth, 
which  translates  into  the low value  of the voucher.  This  theory  is implau- 
sible  once it is realized  that  there  was perhaps  $15  billion  of capital  flight 
from Russia in 1992.22  Moreover, foreigners  can participate  freely in 
voucher  auctions, which again  raises the available  pool of capital. Why 
wouldn't  a foreign  investor buy 20 percent  of ZIL for $3 million, when 
foreigners  are paying billions for automobile  and truck companies in 
eastern  Europe?  The capital  shortage  story  cannot  plausibly  explain  the 
low valuation. 
The plausible  explanations  fall under  a general  category:  expropria- 
tion of shareholders  by stakeholders.  That is, while assets themselves 
have some value, the part  of the return  to these assets that is expected 
to accrue  to outside shareholders  after  the stakeholders  have taken  their 
own cut is very small.  Three  important  types of stakeholders  take a cut. 
The first is employees. As one very progressive  Russian manager  has 
put it, the goal of his privatized  company is to raise its efficiency and 
make  profits  so that  it can increase  wages. Many  Russian  firms  continue 
to pay for kindergartens,  hospitals, schools, and  other services for their 
workers. There is little doubt that, particularly  with the high levels of 
employee  ownership  in Russian  companies,  some of the profits  will con- 
tinue to be spent on wages and benefits to the workers. One sobering 
fact in this regard  is the experience  of the German  privatization  agency, 
Treuhandanstalt.  Because it had to make up-front  payments  to buyers 
to get them to agree to maintain  employment  after privatization,  the 
agency experienced  a net loss of $200  billion  from  its sale of firms.  The 
cost was so large  because of the excessive wages that eastern German 
companies  had  to pay their  workers  after  privatization.  Even so, the dra- 
matic  losses reflect  the extraordinary  value of workers'  claims  even in a 
country  like Germany,  where, unlike  Russia, workers  are not majority 
owners  of firms. 
The second important  set of stakeholders  is managers,  who are likely 
to expropriate  shareholder  wealth through  asset sales to their own pri- 
vately held businesses and other forms of dilution.  This theft by man- 
agers is probably  the principal  reason for the remarkably  high capital 
flight  from  Russia. As we will explain  further  below, shareholder  rights 
22. See Celeste  Bohlen,  "Billions  Bleed Out  of Russia  As Its Wealth  Is Sent  Abroad," 
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in Russia  are not protected,  and  few companies  expect to pay dividends 
in the near  future,  leaving  more  for managers  to take. 
The last stakeholder  responsible  for reducing  firm value to outside 
shareholders  is the government,  which expropriates  firm  value through 
taxes, regulations,  restrictions  on product  mix and layoffs, custom du- 
ties, and many other interventions,  including  potential  nationalization. 
The fear of government  expropriation  is often referred  to as political  in- 
stability,  and  surely  explains  some of the low value  to outside  sharehold- 
ers. Of  course, expropriation  of shareholders  by the government  is noth- 
ing  other  than  continued politicization of  now-privatized firms. 
Evidently,  the Russian  market  estimates  that  such  politicization  is likely 
to continue so that, among them, the three types of stakeholders  will 
grab  about  99 percent  of shareholder  wealth.23 
In sum, voucher  auctions  have been a great  success and  have helped 
move a substantial  part  of the Russian  industry  into the private  sector, 
even though  the implied  asset values  have been very low. The next ques- 
tion is whether  rapid  privatization  is likely to lead to restructuring. 
Product Market Competition 
In the second section, we argued  that  privatization  is only one of sev- 
eral steps needed to depoliticize Russian firms. In the next three sec- 
tions, we discuss the other  steps, beginning  with  product  market  compe- 
tition. As we argued  above, product  market  competition  is extremely 
important  in raising  the cost to politicians  of influencing  firms. For this 
reason, competition strategy, including  facilitation  of entry and open- 
ness to imports, has been a critical reform  strategy  in Poland  and the 
Czech Republic.  Unlike these countries,  Russia has not had much suc- 
cess with competition as a depoliticization  strategy, both because it 
started  out with  an extremely  uncompetitive  economy and  because  poli- 
cies failed  to foster competition. 
Russia inherited  from central  planning  a highly  uncompetitive  econ- 
omy. To facilitate  central  control, most industries  were highly  concen- 
23. Following  Yeltsin's  victory  over  the parliament  in October  1993,  the voucher  price 
doubled  to more  than  $20. Even with this increase, the total value of Russian  assets re- 
mains  very low. Nevertheless, the event demonstrates  that the possible increase  in the 
security  of property  that  accompanied  the demise  of the parliament  doubled  the valuation 
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trated.24  Import  penetration  in most sectors  has been extremely  low, and 
trade  collapsed  with the collapse of COMECON.  Finally, central  plan- 
ners  have established  very rigid  supply  chains  and  built  a transportation 
and storage  system to match  these rigid  supply  chains. As a result, most 
Russian firms, even if they were not unique producers of particular 
goods, bought their inputs only from specifically  designated  suppliers 
and sold their outputs only to specifically designated customers. No 
competition worked or could easily begin to  work in most goods 
markets. 
Of course, competition  policy could address  these problems.  Unfor- 
tunately,  in Russia, such policy has done the reverse. Moscow bureau- 
crats-whose  personal  financial  concerns  have not been allayed  by pri- 
vatization-have plotted  to resurrect  their  ministries  in the form  of trade 
associations  and financial-industrial  groups, so as to facilitate  both col- 
lusion and subsidized  finance  from the central  bank. To this end, they 
have tried  to consolidate,  rather  than  break  up, firms.  Nor is there  much 
talk about opening  up foreign  trade  and stimulating  competition  in this 
way: existing  firms  rarely  fail to get protection.  Even at the local level, 
where  competition  could  probably  be the single  most reliable  strategy  of 
depoliticization,  politicians  have restricted  it. Many  local governments 
have already taken actions to protect incumbent firms from entry 
through licensing and other anticompetitive strategies. The Russian 
antimonopoly  committee  has been captured  by the interests  of bureauc- 
racy  and  managers  fearing  competition.  It has no interest  in breaking  up 
large  firms  or encouraging  entry. It has shown a strong  interest in pre- 
venting privatization  of those firms with market  power (that is, most 
firms)  on the grounds  that it is easier to regulate  prices of state firms.  In 
fact, the antimonopoly  committee  argued  for the consolidation  of firms 
into monopolies  so as to make  price  regulation  easier. Finally,  privatiza- 
tion  of transport,  which  may  be the single  most effective procompetition 
strategy,  has been slow in most regions. 
Moreover, competition  is most effective when companies  that lose 
money actually go bankrupt. The Russian bankruptcy  law, written 
under  close supervision  of the managerial  lobby, allows for effectively 
24. Joint  Study  (1991)  presents  some evidence  on industrial  concentration  in the Rus- 
sian  economy.  Brown,  Ickes, and  Ryterman  (1993),  however,  argue  that  the  Russian  econ- 
omy is no more  concentrated  than  the U.S. economy, and  simply  does not have as many 
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permanent  "rehabilitation"  of bankrupt  companies  under  existing man- 
agement.  In part  as a response  to this law, and  in part  as consequence  of 
a long history of borrowing  from the government,  Russian companies 
rarely  repay  their  debts. As long as debts and  negative  cash flows do not 
result  in hardships  for the management  but simply  lead to help from  the 
government,  depoliticization  will remain  an elusive goal. 
This leaves us with a fairly pessimistic view of the role of product 
market  competition  in depoliticizing  Russian  firms  in the near  future,  de- 
spite the fact that free trade, free entry, and other policies promoting 
competition  have been essential in depoliticizing  firms in eastern Eu- 
rope. While we argue  below that other depoliticization  strategies  have 
worked  better  in Russia, competition  policy remains  a gaping  hole in the 
reforms. 
Corporate Governance  through Equity Ownership 
In discussing equity governance, we will distinguish  between man- 
agement  and outside shareholder  ownership.  As we argued  in the sec- 
ond section, management  ownership works as a governance device 
when managers  refuse  to cater  to the preferences  of the politicians.  Ide- 
ally, managers  must have high ownership  stakes, yet at the same time 
not be completely entrenched,  so that outside investors can oust them 
when they fail to maximize  profits.  To begin, we briefly  discuss the evo- 
lution  of management  ownership  in Russia. 
Systematic  data  on management  and other shareholder  ownership  in 
Russia do not exist. Two researchers  working  at GKI, Joseph Blasi and 
Katharina  Pistor, have conducted  small surveys of firms  that ask man- 
agers about  the ownership  structure  of their  firms.  The surveys ask not 
only about  the results of voucher  auctions, but about  the actual  owner- 
ship structure  that emerges  after  some trading  of shares. Tables  5 and 6 
present the preliminary  results of these two surveys, which together 
cover fifty-five  firms. The data in these surveys are self-reported  and 
hence in some cases may be incorrect.  Nonetheless, the overall  results 
present  a very clear  picture. 
In the Blasi sample, shown in table 5, between closed subscription, 
ESOPs,  and  subsequent  acquisition  of shares,  managers  and  workers  to- 
gether  end up owning  an average  of 70 percent  of the company.  Of that, -o  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
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about 17 percent on average is owned by the management  team, of 
which about 7 percent on average (and less than 3 percent if one com- 
pany  is excluded)  is owned by the CEO.  The ownership  of the additional 
shares  is divided  between outsiders  and the property  fund (the govern- 
ment),  with the outsiders  owning  an average  of 14  percent  and  the prop- 
erty fund owning an average of 16 percent. Note that in many cases a 
good chunk  of the shares  of the property  fund  is claimed.  In many  com- 
panies, 10  percent  of the property  fund  shares  are  going  to be transferred 
to the ESOP, and in a few cases, such as ZIL, an investment  tender  is 
planned. Thus the 70 percent figure probably  underestimates  insider 
ownership. 
Pistor's sample, shown in table  6, covers larger  firms  than  Blasi's but 
also oversamples  a few specialized  regions. For example, Pistor's sam- 
ple includes six firms  (observations  19-24) from the Ivanovo textile re- 
gion, which had peculiar  variant 1 privatizations  with virtually  no out- 
side investors. Nonetheless, Pistor's results are surprisingly  similar  to 
Blasi's. On average, management  and workers  in her sample together 
own about 61 percent of the equity. Her data do not allow us to divide 
this between managers  and  workers.  Outsiders  on average  own about 19 
percent, as does the property  fund. Pistor's sample appears to have 
fewer completed ESOP transactions, so property  fund ownership is 
likely to fall. Pistor's sample thus confirms  the overwhelming  insider 
ownership  of Russian  firms. 
The evidence suggests that management  teams end up owning con- 
siderably  more  than  they get in the closed subscription.  They usually  get 
5 to 10  percent  of the shares  of their  companies  from  the combination  of 
the subsidized  distribution  and shares they get through  the ESOPs. In 
Blasi's data, however, they end up with 17 percent, on average, even 
though  ESOPs have not yet been distributed  in most companies. Man- 
agers usually try to enhance their ownership stake by buying more 
shares both in the voucher auctions and from workers. Sometimes the 
managers  get loans  from  the company  to supplement  their  stakes. In the 
end, managers  end up with much  higher  ownership  than  they got in the 
closed subscription. 
High  as the managerial  ownership  of cash flows is, it probably  under- 
estimates  their  degree of control. Indeed, managers  in most companies 
aggressively  consolidated  their control beyond that warranted  by their 
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or through  formal trust arrangements.  In several takeover situations, 
managers  succeeded in keeping  their  jobs only because of worker  sup- 
port. In many  companies,  managers  actually  encourage  workers  to buy 
more  shares  to consolidate  their  own control. 
This emerging  picture  of workers  as allies of the managers-who not 
only  fail  to provide  any monitoring  of the managers,  but  actually  contrib- 
ute to their  entrenchment-is unique  in Russia. In Poland  and  elsewhere 
in eastern  Europe,  workers'  collectives often  counterbalance  managers' 
control-although not necessarily with the best results for restructur- 
ing. In Russia, in contrast, workers' collectives appear  to be passive, 
although  of course this passivity might  be a reciprocation  for highly  ac- 
commodating  managerial  practices. Thus, while worker passivity al- 
layed the fears of many who worried  about worker control, the price 
managers  pay for worker  support  may  well be the slowdown  of restruc- 
turing.  The greatest  fear  is that  when credit  constraints  begin  to tighten, 
workers  will become natural  allies of politicians  in preventing  restruc- 
turing,  and  thus will disrupt  depoliticization  of firms. 
In sum, Russian  managers  are often emerging  from  privatization  with 
quite substantial  ownership  of cash flows. They are also emerging  with 
a tremendous  amount  of control,  particularly  because of their  influence 
over workers'  collectives. In smaller  companies, this ownership  struc- 
ture may well be efficient  because it provides managers  with a strong 
incentive to maximize  profits, as long as they do not get captured  by 
workers'  collectives. In the largest  companies,  however, some external 
checks are needed on managers  to prevent  their  entrenchment  and cap- 
ture  by politicians. 
Table  5 provides  some data  on large  shareholders  from  the Blasi sam- 
ple. On average, about 14  percent of the shares  is owned by outside in- 
vestors. Of  that,  about  9.5 percent  is owned  by blockholders  whom  man- 
agers were willing to identify to the interviewer.  Thus, in this sample, 
blockholders  acquire  almost two-thirds  of the shares that outsiders  get 
in the voucher  auctions (recall  that managers  and workers  also partici- 
pate  actively). Pistor's  data  in table  6 present  a similar  picture.  Of the 19 
percent  of shares owned by outsiders  in the companies  in her sample, 
about 10.6 percent on average is owned by blockholders. In Pistor's 
sample,  investment  tenders  have been completed  more  frequently  than 
in Blasi's, and so the blockholders  have gotten their shares through 
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Evidence  from  the largest  companies,  where  blockholders  are  partic- 
ularly  important  for restructuring,  suggests  an even greater  presence. In 
ZIL, the largest  Russian  enterprise  privatized  so far, out of the 30 per- 
cent of shares  offered in a voucher auction, 28 percent  were bought  by 
seven large  investors.  Moreover,  all  these investors  appear  to have busi- 
ness ties, so ZIL might  end up with a single shareholder  controlling  25 
to 30  percent  of the shares.  A private  company  holds an 18  percent  stake 
in Uralmash,  another  industrial  giant. A Russian  graduate  of Harvard 
Business School bought  a 6 percent  stake  in his former  employer,  Vladi- 
mir  Tractor  Works,  and  tried  to become the CEO. Alpha  Capital,  an ag- 
gressive investment  fund, bought a 10 percent stake in the Bolshevik 
cake factory. Similar  stories can be told about  other well-known  priva- 
tizations. 
This evidence underscores  the importance  of voucher  tradability  for 
the formation of  blockholdings in Russia. Accumulating blocks of 
vouchers and then bidding  them in a voucher auction is the principal 
strategy  by which  potential  large  investors  can get their  blocks. Without 
voucher tradability,  the only strategies  for accumulating  large blocks 
would  be to start  an  investment  fund,  which  some large  blockholders  are 
clearly  doing,  or to buy shares  in the aftermarket,  which  is very difficult. 
The creation  of a liquid  market  for vouchers  has enabled  the Russian  pri- 
vatization to do what for political reasons it could not accomplish  di- 
rectly:  to create core investors  for many  major  companies. 
Who are these large blockholders  in Russia? They appear  to be of 
three  types. The first  is private  voucher  investment  funds  that  were cre- 
ated following  the Czech model. These funds collect vouchers  from  the 
population in exchange for their own shares and then invest them 
through  voucher  auctions. GKI evidence indicates  that so far 550  funds 
have been formed. They have 12 million shareholders  and have col- 
lected 25 million  vouchers, or one-sixth of the total. The largest  funds 
are  located  in Moscow: the three  largest  had 1.8 million,  1.1 million,  and 
0.95 million  vouchers, respectively, at the end of June 1993. 
What  do the funds  do with  the vouchers?  Apparently,  about  one-third 
of the vouchers have been invested in privatizing  companies. But until 
recently, funds were also actively speculating  in vouchers, buying  and 
selling  them  across Russia  to take advantage  of price  differences  across 
space and time. Most Russian  funds appear  disinterested  in corporate 
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fund, have acquired  large  stakes in several  companies  and  have actively 
challenged  the management.  This corporate  governance  role of invest- 
ment  funds  is only likely to increase. 
The second type of large  investor  consists of wealthy  individuals  and 
private  firms  that made their  fortunes  in the last few years in trade  and 
other  commercial  activities.  These investors  often  have the financial  and 
perhaps  even the physical muscle to stand up to the managers.  While 
managers  try to discourage  these investors, in some cases, their pres- 
ence is clear:  these investors, for example, purchased  the largest  share 
of ZIL, Uralmash,  and  Vladimir  Tractor  Works. 
The third  category  of large  investors  is foreigners.  To them, the mar- 
ket prices in voucher auctions present a major  attraction.  At the same 
time, they do not usually openly challenge  the managers,  for fear of a 
political  reaction.  Indeed,  they usually  acquire  their  stakes  through  Rus- 
sian intermediaries.  Foreign investors are still insignificant  relative to 
other  large  shareholders,  but they might  come to play an important  role 
in restructuring. 
Anecdotal  evidence suggests that large  shareholders  often try to use 
their votes to change company  policies, although  less often to change 
management.  Alpha  Capital,  for example, has started  campaigns  to get 
firms  it invested in to pay dividends.  Other  large  investors  want  firms  to 
sell some of their  land  holdings.  In some cases, such as Vladimir  Tractor 
Works, an outside investor offered his candidacy  to run the company, 
but lost to the incumbent  manager. 
So far, corporate managers  have resisted these challenges fiercely 
and  rather  successfully. Managers  threaten  the workers  with dismissals 
if they do not support  the incumbent,  and  appear  to be getting  the critical 
worker support. But managers  also physically threaten  challengers  at 
shareholder  meetings, rig shareholder  votes, illegally  change  corporate 
charters  (from  one share-one vote to one shareholder-one  vote, for ex- 
ample),  refuse  to record  share  trades  in corporate  share  registers,  and  so 
on. Most of these activities are not reported  in the press. The current 
situation  is best described  as a stalemate:  large  outside shareholders  are 
clearly  posing  a challenge  to the existing  management,  but  management, 
in  turn,  often  with  the support  of the workers,  has managed  to repel  most 
threats.  The market  for corporate  control  in Russia is very lively; it re- 
mains to be seen whether it is effective enough to get restructuring 
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The  key question  is whether  the large  shareholders  will  be able  to play 
their role without being stopped by the political process. Many man- 
agers  are appealing  to the local governments  and to the central  govern- 
ment  to restrain  large  investors. The management  of Bolshevik has un- 
successfully lobbied GKI to force Alpha Capital,  its large investor, to 
sell its shares.  The government  of Primorsky  Krai  (the southeastern  sea- 
coast region of Russia) has temporarily  stopped privatization  after a 
couple of enterprise  managers  were sacked in a shareholder  vote. And 
perhaps  in the most extraordinary  action so far, the head of ZIL, the 
ubiquitous  truck maker,  has appealed  to President  Yeltsin to keep the 
government's  control  of the company  through  a "golden  share"  (with  no 
dividend rights and a veto power over major  restructuring  decisions) 
that  will be kept by the government,  thus eliminating  the controlling  in- 
fluence  of the outside investors. 
In sum, the transition  from political  to private  governance  is clearly 
very painful. Politicians  do not give up their control over enterprises 
very easily. They have resisted  privatization  from  the start,  and  they are 
still trying  to bring  firms  under  the control  of industry  associations  and 
financial-industrial  groups.  Moreover,  the residual  equity  stakes  that  re- 
main  in the hands of property  funds may well be used in the future  to 
reassert  political  control  over enterprises. 
As political  governance  recedes, it is replaced  to a significant  extent 
by managerial  control. Such control  is better  than  control  by politicians 
because managers  with significant  ownership  stakes have more  interest 
in value maximization  and restructuring.  Nonetheless, in many cases, 
managerial  ownership  needs to be supplemented  by large  outsider  own- 
ership  to put pressure  on the managers  and workers' collectives to re- 
structure.  As of now, large  outside shareholders  face tremendous  resis- 
tance from both managers  and politicians in exercising their control 
rights. Still, they remain  the most effective source of external gover- 
nance  in Russia.  In the future,  their  role will increase  when  they become 
a source of capital,  and not  just oversight. 
Capital Allocation 
Effective restructuring  is thwarted  by political allocation  of capital. 
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to maintain  high  output  and employment,  these firms  have no incentive 
to restructure,  even if they have made headway  in other dimensions  of 
depoliticization.  Moreover, firms  that do not get capital as part of the 
political  allocation  can achieve only limited  restructuring,  because sub- 
stantial  restructuring  usually requires  capital. In this section, we show 
that capital  allocation  in Russia now is completely  politicized and sug- 
gest some strategies  for improving  this dismal  situation. 
Current Capital Allocation 
Most capital  of Russian  enterprises  still comes from  the state, which 
includes both subsidies from the budget and directed credits from the 
central  bank.  In 1992,  total subsidies  from  the budget  accounted  for 21.6 
percent of GDP.25  Most of these subsidies went to enterprises  and in- 
cluded import  subsidies, energy subsidies, and subsidies  for making  in- 
terest  payments  on already  subsidized  credits.  Directed  credits  from  the 
central  bank  to enterprises  added  up to an additional  21 percent  of GDP. 
Agriculture  was the principal  beneficiary  of these directed  credits, tak- 
ing up 7.5 percent  of GDP, but energy  and  industry  received substantial 
subsidies  as well. Credit  expanded  very rapidly  in the beginning  of 1993 
but slowed down by mid-1993.26 
The allocation  of credits and subsidies is highly  politicized, in terms 
of who benefits  and by how much. Agriculture,  energy, and very large 
manufacturing  firms  are the main beneficiaries  of the government  and 
central  bank  policies. Firms  fortunate  enough  to get credits  through  the 
central  bank  obtain  them at negative  real interest  rates. In addition,  the 
government  often subsidizes the enterprise's  interest payments to the 
central  bank. Finally, enterprises  often do not repay the loans, except 
from  proceeds from the new loans. Thus, the combination  of subsidies 
and loans reallocates massive resources to some sectors of the econ- 
omy. It is not surprising,  in this regard,  that  Russia  has made  no progress 
in  privatizing  agriculture:  what  farmer  would  take  the fat of the land  over 
that  of the central  bank? 
In its allocation  of credit, the central  bank  does not discriminate  be- 
tween state-owned and privatized  firms. All firms deemed worthy of 
25. Data  in this section  come from  World  Bank  (1993a,  1993b). 
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credits  get them.27  This, of course, does not bode well for the effective- 
ness of privatization  in getting  restructuring  going. 
Central  bank  credits  are  channeled  through  commercial  banks.  Many 
of the banks  are descendants  of former  Soviet sectoral  banks, in which 
case they simply  allocate central  bank  credits  to enterprises  in their  re- 
spective sectors. Such is the situation  in agriculture  and construction, 
for example. In addition, some enterprises have themselves formed 
commercial  banks  that take credits  from  the central  bank  and then pass 
them  through  to the enterprises  that  founded  them, their  suppliers,  and 
customers. Commercial  banks thus do not make credit allocation any 
less political,  or any more  conducive  to restructuring. 
While some selected sectors are getting credits, it appears that 
smaller  firms  in Russia have been substantially  cut off from the public 
subsidies  and  credits. For example, the majority  of firms  in Blasi's sam- 
ple did not report  receiving subsidies or subsidized  credits from com- 
mercial  banks, and complained  about not having  enough capital  to re- 
structure.  The central  bank  explictly denies credits to new firms  on the 
grounds  that  lending  to them is unsafe. The question  is: can these firms 
find  capital  elsewhere if they want to restructure? 
It appears  that private  capital  markets  do not meet this need. Some 
privatized  firms  are planning  a public  equity issue in the fall of 1993,  al- 
though  it is not entirely  clear  how much  they can raise  without  promising 
investors dividends, restructuring,  or at least a governance  role. Some 
commercial  banks are providing  credit from their own resources, but 
that situation  usually occurs only when there are noncommercial  rea- 
sons for making  loans or when debt contracts  can be enforced  by physi- 
cal force. This is not surprising:  lending as a practice does not make 
sense without  a bankruptcy  procedure  that  gives creditors  access to the 
borrower's  assets, but such a procedure  does not exist in Russia. With- 
out bankruptcy,  debt contracts  cannot  really  work. Rapid  inflation  is an 
additional  factor that undermines  long-term  lending by banks of their 
own funds. Finally, many privatized firms-and  even  state enter- 
prises-are  forming  joint ventures  with  private  domestic  and  foreign  in- 
27. According  to a senior  official  at the central  bank,  the question  of public  versus  pri- 
vate  ownership  does not come up  in the decisions  to allocate  credits  by the credit  commis- 
sion. The same  official,  when  asked  whether  the central  bank  would  always  give credit  to 
a firm  on the verge  of shutting  down, said  that  "the  bank  would  never  let things  go that  far, 
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vestors, which gives them access to some capital  and know-how.28  De- 
spite the success of joint ventures, they remain a trivial part of the 
Russian  capital  market.  Political risk remains  great, and the exchange 
rate, tax, and bribery  policies toward  foreign investors are predatory. 
Thus,  at least in the near  future,  private  markets  will not address  the cap- 
ital needs of restructuring  Russian  enterprises. 
In sum, capital  allocation  in Russia is the main  roadblock  to restruc- 
turing.  Central  bank  lending  policies are highly  politicized,  whereas  the 
rapid  inflation  undermines  whatever  private  capital  allocation  might  be 
emerging.  Firms not benefiting  from central  bank credits face a harder 
budget  constraint  and are beginning  to restructure.  However, substan- 
tial restructuring  of these firms  requires  capital, which is not forthcom- 
ing  from  the commercial  banks  until  inflation  subsides. Stabilization  will 
obviously improve  this situation  greatly.  In the meantime,  the question 
of how to deliver  capital  to the private  firms  must  be addressed. 
Privatization  and Stabilization 
An essential  step to rationalizing  capital  allocation  in Russia  is to con- 
trol aggregate  credits and subsidies and thus to stabilize the ruble. In- 
deed, most Western  attention  and aid have been focused on stabiliza- 
tion. This attention raises the question of the relationship  between 
privatization  and stabilization.  Some analysts have argued  that priva- 
tization  disrupts  the existing  economic  structure,  and  so monetary  stabi- 
lization  should  take the first  priority.  Once the economy stabilizes, pri- 
vatization and restructuring  can take place.  This position is  best 
described  as "stabilizing  socialism."  An alternative  position  argues  that 
privatization  should take the first precedence. Once firms  are private, 
stabilization  can work. 
Both these views are wrong. The main  expense of the Russian  gov- 
ernment,  and  hence the main  reason  for money creation,  is cheap credit 
to state industry  and  agriculture.  As long as firms  remain  public,  the ba- 
sic demand  for subsidies-and hence money  creation  and  inflation-will 
28. Foreign  investors  preferjoint  ventures  over  outright  ownership  of Russian  compa- 
nies because  they can focus on the part  of the Russian  company's  business  that  actually 
has some promise,  do not inherit  the liabilities  from  the remaining  businesses, and allow 
the incumbent  management  to retain  control  over the rest of the firm.  Moreover,  the firm 
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not go away. Foreign aid can temporarily  plug the hole by replacing 
money creation  with dollars  in subsidies  to state firms.  But such stabili- 
zation is only temporary.  As long as the basic demand  for politically 
driven credit remains, stabilization cannot succeed without priva- 
tization. 
For a similar  reason, privatization  cannot  lead to restructuring  if the 
government  continues to print  money and subsidize selected firms  and 
sectors. Privatization  of agriculture  in Russia  has been subverted  by the 
government's  credit  policies. Politicization  of capital  allocation  is made 
possible precisely by the ability of the government to print money. 
When  this ability  is limited,  subsidizing  selected firms  as long as they do 
not restructure  will prove much costlier. This will allow private  gover- 
nance and capital  supply  mechanisms  to begin  to play a role, and hence 
create a hope of restructuring. 
Privatization  and stabilization  policies are thus complementary.  Pri- 
vatization  allows the demand  for state credit  to fall, which  in turn  makes 
stabilization  possible. Stabilization  cripples  the political  credit mecha- 
nism, and  in this way stimulates  restructuring. 
Foreign Aid 
Foreign  aid to Russia  has been designed  in part  to solve the problem 
with the allocation of capital. Stabilization  aid will partially replace 
loans to state firms  financed  with newly created money. While this ap- 
proach  will not encourage  the restructuring  of state firms,  it may reduce 
money creation  and inflation,  and so benefit  capital  allocation.  In addi- 
tion, G-7 countries  have offered a package  of privatization  assistance, 
designed  at least in part  to provide  capital  for restructuring  enterprises. 
We discuss this element  of the aid package  below. 
The first question to answer is, why should Western governments 
provide aid money for investment  in Russia when private  investors do 
not want  to invest there?  Russia  does not evidently  have a capital  short- 
age, as evidenced  by enormous  capital  flight.  The returns  on aid  projects 
will probably  not exceed the returns  on private  projects,  which suggests 
that, economically, investment  assistance is hard  to justify. Arguably, 
aid-financed  Western  investment  will demonstrate  that there are profit- 
able investment  opportunities  in Russia. It is hard  to believe, however, 
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The main  reason  for foreign  capital  assistance is political.  It is essen- 
tial  to restructure  some of the Russian  enterprises  reasonably  fast to gain 
support  for privatization,  and  such restructuring  might  not be forthcom- 
ing without  capital  in the form of aid. The projects  in the first  place are 
unlikely  to earn market  returns  because of the likely expropriation  by 
politicians and workers. The high returns-both  political and eco- 
nomic-on  such aid will come when enterprises  begin to restructure, 
and  Russia  moves more  solidly into the market  economy. 
The  critical  question  is how to provide  some badly  needed  investment 
finance  in a country  like Russia. We have already  argued  that conven- 
tional  loans will not work in Russia because the bankruptcy  procedure 
gives so few rights to creditors. In addition, the obvious providers  of 
loans in market  economies-commercial banks-remain controlled  to a 
significant  extent by the central  bank  and  the enterprises,  and  hence can- 
not be relied upon to allocate the loans commercially.  And if the loans 
are processed  through  the government  or a new government  lending  in- 
stitution, they are also sure to become politicized and worthless from 
the viewpoint  of restructuring. 
In part to circumvent  the problem  with politicization  of loans, the 
Russian  government  has proposed  a system of capital  allocation  through 
regional  enterprise  funds. These funds would be originally  capitalized 
with  Western  aid money, but  would  also be able  to raise  both equity  and 
debt in the public markets. Other  than the initial  capitalization,  these 
funds  will be managed  privately  and  have an incentive  to maximize  their 
returns.  Having  raised  their  capital,  these funds would then invest it in 
equity  of restructuring  Russian  firms,  which  would  give them  a more  sig- 
nificant  governance role than they could get with debt. In addition  to 
capital, these funds might  bring  know-how  and foreign  partners  to the 
table. The reason  for making  funds  regional  is, first, to make  them com- 
pete with each other and, second, to keep them away from Moscow to 
reduce political influence on them. While located in the regions, the 
funds could invest elsewhere in Russia to avoid their capture  by local 
politicians  as well. Finally, creating  many  small  funds  would  further  re- 
duce the likelihood  of their  capture  by politicians. 
Most G-7 countries have accepted the idea of regional enterprise 
funds as the basis of post-privatization  assistance to Russia. Several 
such regional  funds are expected to start up in 1994. But even if they 
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nearly  as much  for depoliticizing  credit  in Russia  as macroeconomic  sta- 
bilization. 
Aid to privatized  firms  through  such enterprise  funds, along  with sta- 
bilization,  can improve  the capital  allocation  process. Given  the pivotal 
role of capital allocation in depoliticization,  progress with these two 
strategies  will determine  the success of restructuring  in Russia. 
The Political Success of Privatization 
As we mentioned  in the introduction,  privatization  began  in late 1991 
as a low-priority  policy and emerged in 1993 as the Russian govern- 
ment's  most  popular  reform.  According  to GKI  opinion  polls, more  than 
60 percent  of the Russian  people support  privatization,  with fewer than 
20 percent  opposing  it. Younger  and  richer  people support  privatization 
more strongly  than older and poorer ones. Perhaps  most importantly, 
privatization  is a very important  part  of the social landscape  in Russia. 
The Number 5 song on the hit parade  for several months was called 
"Wow!  Wow! Voucher!" 
Privatization  has benefited  both other  reforms  and  the reformers  (al- 
though it began too late to prevent most reformers  from being sacked 
from  the government).  The managerial  lobby is no longer  as strenuously 
opposed  to reform  as it was in 1992,  in  part  because  many  managers  have 
gotten a lot of shares and hence are quite excited about privatization. 
Privatization  is going much better in reformist  regions, such as St. Pe- 
tersburg  and Nizhny Novgorod, and makes other reforms  in those re- 
gions easier  to carry  out. 
But rather  than  just cheerlead  for privatization,  we can offer some 
statistical evidence concerning its political impact. Table 7 presents 
cross-regional  regressions  interpreting  the results of the April  25 refer- 
endum, in which voters expressed their support  for President  Yeltsin 
and economic reform.  Separate  regressions  are shown for the full sam- 
ple, for regions with auction results, and for regions with substantial 
sales of firms.  The results  are rather  striking  in the subsample  of regions 
where substantial  privatization  took place. Controlling  for urbanization 
and relative income, both of which are associated with higher  support 
for Yeltsin  and  reform,  regions  with more  privatization  had  significantly 
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Table 7.  Regressions of Referendum Results on Privatization Variables and Regional 
Characteristicsa 
Sample for question I  Sample for question 2 
regressions  r-egressions 
Regions  Regions 
having  having 
sold  sold 
more  more 
than ten  than ten 
Regions  large  Regions  large 
with  enterprises  with  enterprises 
available  before  available  before 
Full  auctioni  June  Fuill  auction  Junze 
Independent variable  sample  resuilts  1993  sample  results  1993 
Intercept  0.0608  0.2075f  0.2004f  0.0769  0.1994f  O.l951f 
(0.0064)  (0.0571)  (0.0591)  (0.0573)  (0.0503)  (0.0517) 
Charter  capital sold  0.0001h  0.00019  0.00019  0.0001h  0.00019  0.00019 
per capitab  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Technical  dummyc  0.0205  0.0668f  0.0554f  0.0193  O.O59f  0.04989 
(0.0246)  (0.0214)  (0.0216)  (0.0220)  (0.0188)  (0.0189) 
Urban  populationd  0.5764f  0.3535f  0.3844f  0.4981f  0.3100f  0.3376f 
(0.0986)  (0.0858)  (0.0863)  (0.0881)  (0.0756)  (0.0755) 
Relative  incomee  0.0678f  0.0664f  0.05499  0.0526f  0.052lf  0.0404h 
(0.0245)  (0.0165)  (0.0239)  (0.0192)  (0.0141)  (0.0209) 
Summary  statistic 
Number  of observations  77  60  57  77  60  57 
R2  0.48  0.56  0.50  0.45  0.55  0.49 
Source: Authors'  regressions  based  on GKI  data. 
a. The dependent  variable  for question I is the share  of people who responded  yes to the question, "Do you 
support  the President?"  The dependent  variable  for question  2 is the share  of people who responded  yes to the 
question,  "Do you support  the economic  reform  program  of the  government?"  Regressions  are  ordinary  least  squares 
of referendum  questions  I and  2 on privatization  variables  and  regional  characteristics.  Numbers  in parentheses  are 
standard  errors. 
b. The amount  of charter  capital  sold per  capita,  by region,  in the sale of large  enterprises. 
c. Reflects  whether  a region  has received  technical  assistance  for privatization. 
d. Percentage  of inhabitants  of a region  who live in cities. 
e.  Relative  income  reflects  the income  of a region  in relation  to the national  average. 
f.  Significant  at I percent. 
g. Significant  at 5 percent. 
h. Significant  at 10  percent. 
5.5 percent  higher  in regions  that  received  technical  assistance  for priva- 
tization  than  in regions  that  did not. 
One interpretation  of these results is that privatization  has helped 
Yeltsin  and  the reformers  win the referendum.  This, of course, is not the 
only interpretation.  It is possible that the more reformist  regions both 
supported Yeltsin and reform, and have privatized more. Unfortu- 
nately,  we do not have an independent  control  for how strongly  a region 
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no privatization  are included.  One possible reason  for this weaker  rela- 
tionship  is that  regions  where  privatization  has not even begun  for some 
exogenous  reason, such as corruption  of the local administration,  do not 
fit the model. 
To summarize,  privatization  has been popular  and arguably  has en- 
abled  other  reforms  to proceed. It is also at least plausible  to infer  from 
the available  data  that  privatization  helped  President  Yeltsin and  the re- 
formers  win the crucial  April  referendum. 
Conclusion 
This  paper  presented  a view of privatization  as a step in the depolitici- 
zation of firms-the  severance of public influence on private enter- 
prises. In this regard,  we focused on four aspects of change  in the way 
firms  are run  and  financed  that  could influence  the success of depolitici- 
zation:  privatization  itself, competition  policy, equity governance,  and 
capital allocation. We then evaluated Russian privatization  from this 
vantage  point. 
In some respects, Russian privatization  has been a great success. 
Firms are being privatized  at a breathtaking  pace. Equity governance 
mechanisms  are emerging  very rapidly,  and some of them, particularly 
large  shareholder  activism,  are  beginning  to shake  up Russian  firms.  The 
population  approves of privatization  and actively participates  in the 
process. 
At the same  time, large-scale  privatization  in Russia  is less than  a year 
old. Most firms remain state-owned, and many have been prohibited 
from  privatizing  at all. Politicians  are not giving  up their  control  of firms 
easily and  are  actively resisting  depoliticization.  Competition  policy has 
not been effective. And  most importantly,  the allocation  of capital  is still 
completely  dominated  by the central  bank,  with  commercial  banks  play- 
ing a relatively  passive role in financial  markets. Nor is it clear that a 
responsible  monetary  policy will emerge  in Russia  in the near  future. 
Last, and  most important,  the political  landscape  in Russia  is treach- 
erous. Old-line  politicians-in  the government,  in the parliament,  and 
in the bureaucracy-by and large  have not been replaced  and continue 
undermining  all reform, including privatization.  The reformers  have 
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the greatest  success of Russian  privatization  has been to undermine  the 
influence of the old-line politicians. The fundamental  open question 
about  the success of privatization  and  other  reform  in Russia  is whether 
the days of these politicians  are really  over.29 
29. This paragraph  was written  before  President  Yeltsin's violent  confrontation  with 
the parliament  in October 1993. Even after this confrontation,  old guard  politicians  in 
Russia  remain  powerful. Comments 
and Discussion 
Stanley Fischer: Privatization  stands out as the most successful ele- 
ment in the Russian reform  program.  Indeed, Russian privatization  is 
even outpacing privatization  in other countries in the former Soviet 
Union  and  in eastern  Europe.  This interesting  paper,  written  by some of 
the important  thinkers  behind  the program,  helps explain  why. 
As in other  reforming  formerly  socialist countries,  small-scale  priva- 
tization  has gone well. Smaller  firms,  especially  in retail  distribution  and 
services, are being sold for cash or leased, by local governments.  The 
importance  of such privatization  for the consumer  should  not be under- 
estimated;  shopping  was difficult  and  time-consuming  in the old system, 
and that problem  has disappeared.  The impact  of small-scale  privatiza- 
tion and  the entry  of new retail  firms  is visible to any visitor. 
The paper  by Maxim  Boycko, Andrei  Shleifer,  and Robert  Vishny is 
about  privatizing  firms  that  account  for 20 percent  of employment;  all of 
light industry is included. Excluded are firms in defense, natural  re- 
sources, health  and  education,  and much  of agriculture. 
The paper  clearly  sets out the three  privatization  options.  The key re- 
sult of the process is summarized  in table  5, which shows that managers 
and  workers  own 70 percent  of the shares  of privatized  firms;  managers 
account  for 17  percent.  The authors  say that  labor  and  management  form 
an alliance, with labor  the weaker  partner.  The paper  provides  little in- 
dependent  evidence on this point. 
The key question posed by the authors at the start of the paper is 
whether  privatization  will lead to restructuring.  While they do not an- 
swer this question explicitly, they indicate that the privatization  may 
have gone too far in the direction  of labor  management.  They also argue 
that  restructuring  will require  nonpolitical  control  over credit  allocation, 
and nonpolitical  governance  of firms,  neither  of which yet obtains. Ap- 
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parently,  the authors,  like other observers, do not yet see much in the 
way of restructuring  taking  place. 
Does that mean that the authors should have urged  delaying priva- 
tization  until  they had invented  a scheme that  would  guarantee  rapid  re- 
structuring?  The answer  is no, because  it was crucial  to move these firms 
out of direct  state control. Should  the lack of restructuring  cause a slow- 
down  of the privatization  process?  Again,  the answer  is no, for the same 
reason.  Nonetheless, this initial  privatization  may not result  in much  re- 
structuring.  The tightening  of credit and macroeconomic  stabilization 
would increase  the efficiency  of privatized  firms,  but it might  be neces- 
sary to attempt  further  restructuring  later to reduce the role of labor  in 
management. 
Was there an alternative  that would have produced  more rapid  re- 
structuring?  The answer is yes, but that decision belonged not to the 
privatizers  but to Boris Yeltsin. He could have pushed for a more ag- 
gressive reform program,  but chose instead to confront his congres- 
sional  rivals  more slowly. 
The authors emphasize the importance  of political factors in their 
discussion of the design of the privatization  program.  They argue that 
privatization  is the one reform  that brings immediate  benefits to con- 
sumers and voters. That is true of the first stage of the process, when 
vouchers are distributed  and consumers  are given ownership  of firms. 
However, it is not true at the restructuring  stage, when unemployment 
is likely to grow-and  that may help explain  why restructuring  has been 
so slow. 
For all the discussion of political  factors, politics nonetheless plays 
the role of a deus ex machina  in much of the paper. Whenever  the au- 
thors are uncomfortable  with a decision-for  instance the inclusion  of 
privatization  option 2-they  attribute  the decision to politics. Presum- 
ably there was usually more than one way to meet the political con- 
straint,  and more  discussion of the choices that were considered  would 
have been helpful. 
The paper gives the impression  that all politicians are bad. But at 
some point it becomes clear that Anatoly Chubais, Boris Yeltsin, and 
the reformers  are good politicians. So this is really a paper about the 
good  guys versus  the bad  guys, and  we do not know  what  drives  the good 
guys, and  what  differentiates  them, except that  we are on their  side and 
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Turning  to financing  mechanisms,  the authors'  emphasis  on the lack 
of capital  markets  is important.  It will take.  time  for commercial  banks  to 
play any major  role in the financing,  and  especially the restructuring,  of 
Russian industry. The authors' support  for the creation of enterprise 
funds and equity, rather  than debt, financing  is problematic  in light of 
their  argument  that  the allocation  of capital  should  not be dominated  by 
the public sector. The enterprise  funds likely to be set up with foreign 
assistance  will have government  shareholders.  If these funds  are to take 
a leading  role in enterprise  governance,  then they will have to be run  on 
a commercial  basis. That  will not be an easy trick  to carry  off either. 
Discussing  other  factors  influencing  the privatization  process, the au- 
thors are skeptical  that competition  through  imports  is likely to play an 
important  role in increasing  market  discipline  and reducing  political  in- 
terference.  While the obstacles to increased  competition  through  trade 
liberalization  are obvious, the international  agencies  and  advisers  to the 
Russians  should  nonetheless  keep pounding  on this issue-for  there  are 
few other  pressures  pushing  in the right  direction. 
The authors  are absolutely  right  to emphasize  that stabilization  is es- 
sential  for restructuring.  The credit  expansion  that  now enables  firms  to 
avoid restructuring  would end if the economy were stabilized.  That is 
the main reason that the opponents of reform  are so hostile to stabili- 
zation. 
In their paper, the authors  do not sufficiently  emphasize  the role of 
new firms. Entry has been at least as important  as privatization  in the 
development  of small  firms.  In the Chinese industrial  expansion, it has 
been more important.  New firms  will be crucial  to the Russian  reform 
program  as well, not least because new firms  will be needed to absorb 
the labor  that  will be shed by restructuring  privatized  firms. 
Beyond  the privatization  of industrial  firms  lies the challenge  of priva- 
tizing  agriculture  and  housing.  Given  the speed at which  the current  pri- 
vatization is proceeding, the authors will soon be able to turn their 
talents  to those problems. 
Jeffrey  D. Sachs: This  paper  offers  us a vivid  look at the tactical  choices 
made in the Russian  privatization  program,  by three of the key partici- 
pants in the process. They have much to be pleased about. In  just two 
years, privatization  has gone from  being  an abstract  idea  of a few radical 
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millions  of workers-and  this after seventy-five years of the brutal  re- 
pression  of private  property. 
Nonetheless,  as  the  authors make clear,  privatization to  date 
amounts  mostly  to a formal  transfer  of ownership  rights,  rather  than  real 
operational  changes  in most enterprises.  It is still  too early  to answer  the 
authors'  central  question:  will privatization  really lead to restructuring 
of the Russian  economy?  They offer  one straw  in the wind:  the low value 
placed  on Russian  corporate  capital  in the voucher  auctions, suggesting 
that  the newly established  property  rights  have not yet passed the mar- 
ket test. Significantly,  after Yeltsin's showdown  with the hardline  par- 
liament  in October 1993, the price of voucher tickets jumped sharply, 
presumably  a reflection  of increased  public  confidence  in the long-term 
success of the reforms. 
Russia's political  and economic reforms  are so far only half formed, 
and a bruising  and long struggle  lies ahead  if the reforms  are to be com- 
pleted successfully. Many of the formal structures  have been put in 
place, but Russia is only fitfully  putting  in place one of the central  fea- 
tures  of a market  economy and  a democratic  society: open competition. 
Most of Russia's elite owes its position, wealth, and  power to an inheri- 
tance  from  the communist  regime,  rather  than  to inventiveness  and  hard 
work. For part of the elite, real competition  is mortally  threatening.  It 
is therefore  not surprising  that the breakthrough  to free parliamentary 
elections in December 1993  came only after  a violent confrontation  with 
the Soviet-era  parliament,  which become the chief political  protagonist 
of the entrenched  old guard.  (The public  had voted new elections in the 
April 1993 referendum, but the parliament leadership had merely 
sneered  at the results.) 
On  the economic  side, there  has been a similar  ferocious  battle  to lock 
in advantages.  Managers  of state  enterprises  and  newly privatized  enter- 
prises seek to shield themselves from shareholders,  foreign competi- 
tion, and new domestic rivals. As Maxim  Boycko, Andrei  Shleifer,  and 
Robert  Vishny make  clear, privatization  has gone forward  rapidly  only 
by meeting the stakeholders more than halfway. The managers and 
workers  are receiving  a substantial  proportion  of the enterprise  capital 
virtually  free of charge.  The authors  state that "voucher  privatization  is 
clearly  the defining  feature  of the Russian  program."  This is not really 
true. The very high distribution  of shares to insiders should be judged 
as an equally defining  feature of Russia's privatization  process to this 
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Russia's  situation  can be compared  with  other  countries  in the region. 
In eastern Europe, early elections eliminated  much of the communist 
political  class, although  postcommunist  parties  continue  to enjoy some 
electoral success  in open competition with centrist and right-wing 
parties. Similarly, many state managers were thrown out by post- 
communist governments (as in Czechoslovakia in 1991) or by anti- 
communist  trade  unions (as in Poland  in 1990).  In Estonia and Latvia, 
Russian politicians and enterprise managers have been deposed by 
young  nationalist  politicians.  In an earlier  case of deep systemic  change, 
Japan  after  World  War  II, the old managerial  elite was summarily  forced 
out by the U.S. occupation  authorities,  bringing  in a new generation  of 
managers. 
In Russia, by contrast, there were no national  elections between the 
coup attempt  and December 1993, so that reformers  had to struggle  to 
privatize the economy while key political actors and enterprise  man- 
agers  from  the old regime  remained  in place. The managers  were able to 
capture  a part  of the privatization  proceeds  far in excess of the achieve- 
ments of the old guard  in the other  economies. As early advisors  on the 
privatization  process, the authors  and  I argued  strongly  for speed above 
perfection  in the distribution  of shares. For the general success of the 
reforms,  which were extremely  precarious  at the start,  it was important 
to "make  facts," by establishing  widespread  private  property  rights. If 
that meant  heavy insider  representation,  that was a cost that should  be 
accepted. As could  be expected, many  state managers  and  workers  who 
were initially  opposed to market  and political  reforms  became support- 
ers after being vested with property  rights  in their enterprises.  From a 
distributional  point of view, the inequities  of insider  distribution  were 
tempered  by the government's  insistence that workers, not managers, 
receive the bulk  of the shares. 
Recent  news from  the trenches  amplifies  the fact that  incumbent  man- 
agers are attempting  to dig in yet further.  The existing corporate  law 
gives weak powers to the board  of directors  (or "supervisory  board,"  in 
Russian  law), and strong  powers to the managers.  Moreover,  managers 
in many enterprises  are leading  efforts to reissue corporate  charters  to 
lengthen  their  tenure  and weaken the boards  still further.  These are un- 
settling  conclusions of a survey of firms  that the authors  and I cospon- 
sored  this summer  carried  out by Katharina  Pistor.  ' This may  be a major 
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explanation  of the low voucher prices, since as minority  owners of the 
enterprises,  voucher  investors  will have little  protection  over their  inter- 
ests. It would  be worthwhile  to test whether  investors  are willing  to pay 
much  more  for enterprise  shares  when they obtain  a controlling  block as 
part  of the purchase. 
Does a precedent  for Russia lie with China, where the old elite has 
kept its position but economic dynamism  has nonetheless been estab- 
lished?  Not really, since the control  of the state enterprises  on the Chi- 
nese economy was always markedly  less than in Russia.2  State enter- 
prises in China  never employed  more  than  20 percent  of the labor  force, 
compared  with 90 percent  in Russia. China's  dynamism  has come in the 
nonstate sector, which grew from the bottom up after 1978.  In Russia, 
nearly  everybody  is still tied to the state system through  budgetary  sub- 
sidies, trade  protection,  and financial  credits, so that  bottom-up  growth 
will be as dynamic  as in China  only if the subsidy  system can first  be dis- 
mantled. 
The most important  question  for Russia is whether  real competition 
will accompany  privatization,  since competition  together with private 
property  is a sine qua non of a functioning  market  system. Will  Russia's 
existing enterprises,  whether state-owned  or newly privatized,  be put 
on a level playing  field  with new entrants  and  foreign  competitors?  This 
question  will be as important  as formal  ownership  transfer  and  corporate 
governance  in determining  the nature  of Russia's economic restructur- 
ing. Indeed, in BPEA,  1:1993, Brian Pinto, Marek Belka, and Stefan 
Krajewski demonstrated that hard-budget  constraints and vigorous 
product  markets  in Poland are provoking  restructuring  even in enter- 
prises still in state hands. 
The authors  are skeptical about the prospects for vigorous product 
market  competition  in Russia. They are also pessimistic  about  the pros- 
pects for effective banking  institutions  procedures  and bankruptcy  pro- 
cedures.  They might  be right  about  prospects  for instilling  market  com- 
petition in Russia, but then the consequences would be devastating. 
With  or without  privatization,  Russia  will have a crippled  economy and 
society. 
Fortunately,  the authors'  judgment is premature.  The struggle  for 
competition  and  openness is hardly  lost. On  the political  front,  Yeltsin's 
showdown  with the parliament  is likely to be viewed in retrospect  as the 
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last stand of communism  in Russia, and the beginning  of open demo- 
cratic competition. The breakthrough  to new elections gives the best 
chance for the rise of a new, competitive  political  class representing  a 
much broader  array  of interests than the old guard. On the economic 
side, the success of the reformers  in pushing  for real competition  has 
tended  to move in parallel  with their  political  strength.  For example, af- 
ter the October  confrontations  with the parliament,  the reform-minded 
finance  minister  was able to cancel cheap central  bank  credits to enter- 
prises; eliminate  the practice of "netting out" interenterprise  arrears, 
thereby  hardening  the enterprises'  budget  constraints;  and  tighten  over- 
all credit  conditions  in the economy in order  to reduce  inflation  and  pro- 
mote restructuring. 
I found myself a bit perplexed  at the paper's  policy conclusions. The 
authors put great stress on regional enterprise funds capitalized by 
Western  aid, yet early  on they rejected  Polish-style  mutual  funds  for fear 
that "state-sponsored  funds owning large stakes in Russian  companies 
would  become politicized  and hence be unable  to enforce restructuring 
policies." They also rather  boldly dismiss the entire  banking  system as 
hopeless, even though Russian banks differ enormously in structure, 
capital adequacy, and reliance on central bank financing.  The World 
Bank is currently  undertaking  a major  program  to help restructure  and 
strengthen  Russian  banks, and it is finding  many cases of serious, pro- 
fessional, market-oriented  banks.  A more  balanced  assessment  of prior- 
ities, including  banking  reform,  trade  liberalization,  and capital  market 
development,  would  add credibility  to this otherwise  excellent paper. 
General Discussion 
Several  panel  members  discussed the prospects  for reform  in Russia. 
Richard  Cooper  emphasized  Jeff Sach's argument  that  no modern  econ- 
omy could work well without product  market  competition, and asked 
where that was going to come from in the case of Russia:  from new en- 
trants  at the small firm  level, as in China, or from foreign trade, as in 
Poland, Hungary,  and the Czech Republic?  He suggested that foreign 
trade  is the only practical  alternative  for Russia, and that it is therefore 
important  to focus on the barriers to  import competition. Charles 
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on subsidies  rather  than  painful  restructuring.  Consequently,  subsidies 
must  be made  expensive for politicians  to offset pressure  for them  from 
interested parties, including managers, workers, and shareholders. 
Barry  Eichengreen  suggested  that the variation  in success of privatiza- 
tion across regions mostly reflects the presence of moribund  elements 
of the military-industrial  complex in certain regions. In these regions, 
privatization  is not very advanced, and politicians  are not inclined to- 
ward  reform. 
Responding  to these comments,  Robert  Vishny agreed  that although 
product  competition  might  be the long-run  savior of the Russian  econ- 
omy, in the short  run  it presents  many  local and regional  political  prob- 
lems. For example, foreign  trade  becomes highly  politicized  where do- 
mestic monopolies exist. Andrei Shleifer  reported  that although  there 
are antimonopoly  commissions in every region, there is no interest in 
competition;  these commissions are primarily  interested  in protecting 
their  region's  firms.  He also indicated  that, although  there  is some entry 
of small  firms  in services, new entrants  have played  a much  smaller  role 
in Russia than in China, Poland, or the Czech Republic. Sachs added 
that, in 1992,  only 4 percent  of the industrial  labor  force worked in pri- 
vate firms  that  were not once owned by the state. 
In response  to questions  about  the outlook  for reform,  the authors  in- 
dicated that they were gloomy about the short-run  prospects. Shleifer 
indicated  that  the paper  focused on Russian  privatization  not because it 
has been particularly  successful, but because for now it appears  to be 
the only avenue for making  progress  in corporate  governance. Vishny 
added  that, nonetheless, there  are at least some hopeful  elements in the 
privatization  underway.  Privatization  provided  workers  and managers 
with  more  opportunity  to benefit  from  efficiency,  an incentive  that  could 
lead to a reduced demand  for subsidies as firms  began to pursue effi- 
ciency in their  own interest. He also stressed that under  privatization, 
managers'  reputations  become important;  they have shareholders  to 
answer  to and  they can be embarrassed  in the press. 
In response to questions, Maxim  Boycko elaborated  on the paper's 
explanation  for the low relative valuations  of Russian  firms. First, po- 
tential  investors  may  fear that  firms  will be controlled  by politicians  and 
will not maximize profits. Second, potential investors may fear that, 
even if value is created, workers  and managers,  rather  than sharehold- 
ers, will capture  it. Robert  Shiller  found  these explanations  insufficient, 190  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
arguing  that  it is hard  to believe that  the average  investor  gives the aver- 
age firm  almost no chance of earning  profits  and returning  them to in- 
vestors. 
Several  participants  focused on the issue of who does and  who should 
control  these enterprises.  Paul  Romer  drew  a parallel  between  the politi- 
cal control  of capital  allocation  in Russia  and the role of government  in 
the United  States. He noted  that  the role of the government  in U.S. capi- 
tal allocation  also presents problems, with the savings and loan crisis 
providing  an example of drastic  failure. He stressed that to devise the 
best policies, it is necessary to learn much more about which sorts of 
institutions  and political  mechanisms  actually  work and which are vul- 
nerable  to failure.  Fred Pryor  noted that the information  about  Russian 
firms  available  to investors and shareholders  was woefully inadequate, 
making  it difficult  for them  to become knowledgeable  about  firms  and  to 
exercise any control. William  Black, making  a similar  point in starker 
terms, suggested that inexperienced  investors would be vulnerable  to 
fraud  and  that  this might  provide  important  political  ammunition  for op- 
ponents of reform. Vishny agreed with Pryor's suspicion that outside 
shareholders  are not sufficiently  informed,  and that this helped keep 
control  in the hands  of insiders. 
Olivier Blanchard said that privatizations in Poland, the former 
Czechoslovakia,  and Hungary  are different  than  in Russia, and that the 
authors'  description  of the process should not be generalized  to these 
other  countries.  In these other  countries,  there  is not much  of a problem 
with politicians  attempting  to retain  control  of firms,  although  firms  do 
lean  on politicians  for help  when  they get into  trouble.  Nonetheless, with 
firms  more or less on their own, workers and managers  face different 
incentives  than  they now do in Russia.  Ned Phelps  raised  the possibility 
that workers  may have more power to resist management  than the au- 
thors suggested;  otherwise, why was it necessary to give them the op- 
portunity  to hold so many  shares?  He also noted  that  the wave of protec- 
tion rackets and bribery is probably an important  drag on private 
investment  and  enterprise. Maxim Boycko,  Andrei Shleifer,  and Robert  W. Vishny  191 
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